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Abstract 
Common cause failures (CCF) are a significant contributor to risk in complex technological systems, 
such as nuclear power plants. Many probabilistic parametric models have been developed to quantify 
the systems subject to the CCF. Existing models include the beta factor model, the multiple Greek 
letter model, the basic parameter model, the alpha factor model and the binomial failure rate model. 
These models are often only capable of providing a point estimate, when there are limited CCF data 
available. Some recent studies have proposed a Bayesian approach to quantify the uncertainties in 
CCF modeling, but they are limited in addressing the uncertainty in the common failure factors only.   
This thesis presents a multivariate Poisson model for CCF modeling, which combines the modeling 
of individual and common cause failures into one process. The key idea of the approach is that 
failures in a common cause component group of 𝑛 components are decomposed into superposition of 
𝑘 (> 𝑛)  independent Poisson processes. Empirical Bayes method is utilized for simultaneously 
estimating the independent and common cause failure rates which are mutually exclusive. In addition, 
the conventional CCF parameters can be evaluated using the outcomes of the new approach. 
Moreover, the uncertainties in the CCF modeling can also be addressed in an integrated manner. The 
failure rate is estimated as the mean value of the posterior density function while the variance of the 
posterior represents the variation of the estimate. A MATLAB program of the Monte Carlo 
simulation was developed to check the behavior of the proposed multivariate Poisson (MVP) model. 
Superiority over the traditional CCF models has been illustrated. 
Furthermore, due to the rarity of the CCF data observed at one nuclear power plant, data of the 
target plant alone are insufficient to produce reliable estimates of the failure rates. Data mapping has 
been developed to make use of the data from source plants of different sizes. In this thesis, data 
mapping is combined with EB approach to partially assimilate information from source plants and 
also respect the data of the target plant. Two case studies are presented using different database. The 
results are compared to the empirical values provided by the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (USNRC).  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A nuclear power plant is a kind of complex technological system that requires high level of safety in 
operation. Enormous and severe consequences that impact the public safety may be caused by the 
failure of the plant. In order to achieve the high reliability of the system, current nuclear power plants 
employ the redundancy design. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a methodology to analyze the 
risk associated with a complex technological system.  
If a failure event cannot be expressed by a product of independent failures of the components, it is 
classified as the dependent failure. A special type of dependent failure is named as common cause 
failure (CCF) because the multi-component failure event is caused by a shared root cause. CCF is the 
reason why at least two components become unavailable simultaneously (Börcsök and Holub, 2008). 
There are four broad types of root causes: hardware equipment failure, human error during operation, 
environmental stress applied to components, and external events that causes environmental effects 
(Mosleh et al., 1989). Most of the common causes can be classified into one of the above. The CCF 
stemming from the first type root cause is also known as cascading failure or component-caused CCF. 
The rest can be simply considered as externally caused CCF (Vaurio, 2007). The NUREG series 
guides for the CCF analysis only take the latter type into consideration and independent failure is 
regarded to result from internal component failure mechanisms (Mosleh et al., 1989). In this thesis, 
CCF is externally caused if not specified.  
Consider for example a two-out-of-three (or 2/3) system as shown by Figure 1.1, which is a 
common redundancy design in nuclear power plants. The two-out-of-three system fails if at least two 
of the three components are in the failure state. This kind of redundancy design improves overall 
system safety as the failures of an individual component do not cause a system failure. This type of 
failure is called independent failure, denoted by the component name with a subscript I such as 𝐴𝐼. 
The actual improvement in system safety can be easily evaluated, if the component failures are 
considered to be stochastically independent to each other.  
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Figure 1.1:2-out-of-3 system without CCF 
In this case, the Boolean expression of the system failure is given as  
𝑆 = (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐵𝐼) ∪ (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) ∪ (𝐵𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) ∪ (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐵𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) 1.1 
However, based on the observations in redundant systems, one component does not only fail 
independently but also simultaneously with other components due to the same root cause within the 
same group. This type of failure is CCF as defined above. Let the capital letter C denote common 
cause failure and subscript denote the components involved in the failure event. Therefore, there exist 
many other failure scenarios for each component. For example, the failure of component A can be 
decomposed into four possible situations rather than the independent one.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Failure scenarios of the component A 
According to the analysis above, the system failure is expressed by Equation 1.2, rather than 
Equation 1.1 above.  
𝑆 = (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐵𝐼) ∪ (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) ∪ (𝐵𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) ∪ (𝐴𝐼 ∩ 𝐵𝐼 ∩ 𝐶𝐼) ∪ 𝐶𝐴𝐵 ∪ 𝐶𝐵𝐶 ∪ 𝐶𝐴𝐶 ∪ 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐶  1.2 
However, the above expression is still arguably correct in practice because it is difficult to classify 
the multi-component events. For instance, when A and B fail simultaneously, one may not be able to 
A 
Fails 
 
AI CAB CBC CABC 
System 
Fails 
A B C 
2/3 
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tell, if historical operation logs are unavailable, whether the event is a CCF event or an event that two 
independent failures happen to occur simultaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to propose a clear 
mutually exclusive classification system for the possible failure scenarios. Unfortunately the present 
literatures cannot meet such a requirement. Meanwhile, since the multiple independent failures do not 
frequently occur simultaneously, the multi-component failures such as 𝐶𝐴𝐵, 𝐶𝐵𝐶 , 𝐶𝐴𝐶  and 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐶  are the 
main contributors to the system failure. Hence, it is important to take the multiple component failures 
into account and quantify them such that a more accurate and reliable failure rate can be given to the 
plant operators.  
There have been several parametric models developed for the CCF analysis up to now such as the 
beta factor model, multiple Greek letter model and alpha factor model. These models are easy to 
understand and calculate, and hence widely utilized in North America. However, they are highly 
dependent on certain simplifying assumptions and rely on plentiful data collected from nuclear plants, 
assumptions which are unrealistic and data which are often unavailable. In the UK, another evaluation 
procedure called utilizes unified partial method (UPM) is adopted for CCF analysis. The UPM 
requires lots of expert judgments that many professionals do not feel comfortable to exercise. The 
field failure data may not be recorded in such specific and detailed manner as the UPM expects. It is 
thus desirable to develop a new modeling framework for CCF that is easy to understand and 
straightforward in parameter estimation.  
In the probabilistic assessment of common cause failure, two types of problems are considered, i.e., 
failure to start and failure to run. The first one usually occurs in dormant/standby safety devices or 
systems whose functioning is often triggered by certain external events. The probability that a standby 
safety system fail to start when triggered is simply called the probability of failure to start. In contrast, 
the second type of failure occurs when an element or system becomes unavailable during operation. It 
is often quantified by failure rate. This thesis focuses on the estimation of failure rates of components 
in the nuclear systems.  
1.2 An illustrative example  
Consider a redundant system with three components, as shown in Figure 1.3. The failure of 
an 𝑖𝑡ℎ  component is modeled as HPP with the failure rate 𝜆𝜆𝑖 .  
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Figure 1.3: A parallel system with 3 components 
And the probability of failure 𝑃𝑖(𝑇) and reliability 𝑅𝑖(𝑇) of the component 𝑖 in the time interval 𝑇 
are  
𝑃𝑖(𝑇) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑇 1.3 
𝑅𝑖(𝑇) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑇 1.4 
1.2.1 One-out-of-three system 
Let's define a one-out-of-three system here, which means at least one component should be reliable in 
order to assure that the system is reliable. The system failure block diagram is shown below.  
                                                          
Figure 1.4: System failure block diagram given one-out-of-three configuration 
This system only involves independent failures of the components. In order to fail the system, all 
the three components should be failed. Based on the above criteria, the probability of failure of the 
system is 
𝑃𝑠(𝑇) = 𝑃1𝑃2𝑃3 = �1 − 𝑒−𝜆1𝑇��1 − 𝑒−𝜆2𝑇��1 − 𝑒−𝜆3𝑇� 1.5 
Since the symmetry assumption is often adopted in the CCG, all the components would be 
considered as similar/identical. In this case, their failure rates for each type are the same. Let 𝜆𝜆𝑘/3 
denote the component level rate of a specific k-component failure event, e.g., 𝜆𝜆1/3 = 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝜆𝜆3. 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
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And let 𝛬𝑘/3 = �3𝑘�𝜆𝜆𝑘/3 denote the total failure rate of k-component failure event in the system, for 
example, 𝛬1/3 = 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3 . Then the above Equation 1.5 could be simplified as 
𝑃𝑠(𝑇) = �1 − 𝑒−𝜆1/3𝑇�3 1.6 
Therefore, the reliability of the above system is  
𝑅𝑠(𝑇) = 1 − �1 − 𝑒−𝜆1/3𝑇�3                                       = 3𝑒−𝜆1/3𝑇 − 3𝑒−2𝜆1/3𝑇 + 𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇 1.7 
However, due to the existence of CCF, the multi-component failures are not only caused by 
multiple independent failures, but also by CCFs in most cases. Therefore, the system failure block 
diagram is modified as shown below. 
                                       
Figure 1.5: System failure block diagram given one-out-of-three configuration 
Since four CCF terms have been added to the diagram in series, in order to ensure that the whole 
system is reliable, each part should be reliable. Hence, the new reliability of the whole system 
becomes 
𝑅𝑠
′(𝑇) = 𝑅𝑠(𝑇)�𝑒−𝜆123𝑇�                               = �3𝑒−𝜆1/3𝑇 − 3𝑒−2𝜆1/3𝑇 + 𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇��𝑒−𝜆3/3𝑇� 1.8 
1.2.2 Two-out-of-three system 
Similarly, define a two-out-of-three system, which means at least two reliable components can assure 
the reliability of the system. Therefore, the cutsets for failing the system are shown in the figure 
below.  
 
 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
𝜆𝜆123 
𝛬3/3 
1/3 
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Figure 1.6: System failure block diagram given two-out-of-three configuration 
According to the symmetry assumption, the reliability of the system without CCF is  
𝑅𝑠(𝑇) = 3𝑅12𝑃1 + 𝑅13 = 3𝑒−2𝜆1/3𝑇�1 − 𝑒−𝜆1/3𝑇� + 𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇                  = 3𝑒−2𝜆1/3𝑇 − 2𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇 1.9 
Taking account of CCF, the system failure block diagram is modified as shown below. 
 
                
Figure 1.7: System failure block diagram given two-out-of-three configuration 
Then the reliability of the system with CCF becomes 
𝑅𝑠
′(𝑇) = 𝑅𝑠(𝑇)�𝑒−𝜆12𝑇��𝑒−𝜆13𝑇��𝑒−𝜆23𝑇��𝑒−𝜆123𝑇�           = �3𝑒−2𝜆1/3𝑇 − 2𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇� �𝑒−�3𝜆2/3+𝜆3/3�𝑇� 1.10 
1.2.3 Three-out-of-three system 
Again, assume a three-out-of-three system, meaning that all the component must be working to make 
sure the system is safe. In other words, any type of failure event will fail the whole system. Since it is 
difficult to calculate all the failure scenarios, one can compute the reliability of system without CCF 
as 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
𝛬3/3 
𝜆𝜆12 𝜆𝜆13 𝜆𝜆23 𝜆𝜆123 
𝛬2/3 
2/3 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆3 
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𝑅𝑠(𝑇) = 𝑅13 = 𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇 1.11 
Taking account of CCF, four CCF terms are added to the system failure block diagram. And the 
reliability becomes Equation 1.12.  
                
Figure 1.8: System failure block diagram given three-out-of-three configuration 
𝑅𝑠
′(𝑇) = 𝑅𝑠(𝑇)�𝑒−𝜆12𝑇��𝑒−𝜆13𝑇��𝑒−𝜆23𝑇��𝑒−𝜆123𝑇�                               = �𝑒−3𝜆1/3𝑇� �𝑒−�3𝜆2/3+𝜆3/3�𝑇� = 𝑒−�3𝜆1/3+3𝜆2/3+𝜆3/3�𝑇 1.12 
1.2.4 Numerical example of 3-component system 
Some failure data are collected from the nuclear power plants. The component is motor-operated 
valve (MOV) and failure mode is 'fail to open' (FO). Operation time is 216 months. Both the 
independent and common cause failures are listed in the table below.  
Table 1.1: Failure rates in a 3-component system 
𝑘 1 2 3 
𝜆𝜆𝑘/3 0.04321 0.001543 0.00463 
 
Substituting the above failure rates into the Equations 1.7 to 1.12 and assuming further operation 
time is 100 (month), one can obtain the reliability of the k-out-of-three system in two different 
situations. The reliabilities of system for each type are calculated without/with CCF. Based on the 
results listed in the table below, it is obvious that without taking account of CCF, the system 
reliability is too much optimistic. This is why the CCF must be accurately evaluated.  
 
 
𝜆𝜆1 
𝜆𝜆2 
𝜆𝜆3 
𝛬3/3 
𝜆𝜆12 𝜆𝜆13 𝜆𝜆23 𝜆𝜆123 
𝛬2/3 
3/3 
  8 
Table 1.2: Reliability of a k-out-of-3 system 
System type Reliability of system 
k-out-of-3 Without CCF With CCF 
1-out-of-3 3.93×10 2.48×10-2 
2-out-of-3 
-2 
5.25×10 2.08×10-4 
3-out-of-3 
-4 
2.35×10 9.29×10-6 
 
-7 
1.3 Motivations 
Although various methods are available for the probabilistic risk assessment of the CCF, a few 
problems remain. First of all, the present parametric models being used are strictly dependent on 
some specific assumptions which simplify the computation and application but are unrealistic to some 
extent. For example, the beta factor model assumes only one type of common cause failure that all the 
components fail as long as a common cause occurs. This is practical and effective for two-component 
group while impractical in situations where the group size is more than two (Kumamoto and Henley, 
1996). Moreover, all these traditional models presume that the components within the same group are 
identical. However, according to the various component manufactories, environments, maintenance 
procedures and other factors, it is better to consider them as different individuals. This treatment 
enables analysts to evaluate a specific component’s behavior.  
Second, failure data in nuclear power plants are very limited even though the nuclear industry has 
had more than 60 years of operation history since the construction of the first commercial nuclear 
reactor. Most of the existing CCF models introduced provide a point estimates of the failure rates of 
interest. However, it is not convincing to use these estimations to represent the real unknown failure 
rates of the components. From a statistical point of view, the point estimator is accurate only when the 
sample size is large enough. Moreover, there may be no failure of a specific scenario observed in a 
certain time interval. Despite the lack of historical failure, it is obviously inappropriate to think that 
the events will never happen in the future and a non-zero failure rate is required for the future 
prediction. Therefore, it is an urgent industrial need that an uncertainty interval be provided.  
Third, to make up for the rarity of data in the target nuclear system, the analysts and researchers 
have adopted a straightforward method called data mapping in order to make use of data collected 
from source plants of different group sizes, the procedures of which have been presented in 
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NUREG/CR-4780. Based on the traditional data mapping, Kvam and Miller (2002) suggest that the 
operation times from source plants be modified and rates be calculated from the sum of failures over 
the sum of modified times. The inherent assumption is that these failures are produced from a single 
Poisson process and the uncertainty in each plant rate estimate can be minimized, which may be 
against the practical observations. In addition, to make the mapping up more accurate, the extra 
parameters are estimated using empirical alpha factors provided by NUREG/CR-5497. Also, the 
Bayesian method is recommended but not addressed in detail (Vaurio, 2007). Therefore, the 
commonly used data mapping can be further improved using some statistical methods so that higher 
effectiveness can be achieved.  
1.4 Objectives 
Regarding the drawbacks of existing models and the scarcity of data in nuclear power plants, it is 
essential to propose new solutions to solve the problems and to yield more reliable estimates for the 
failure rates of the components.   
This thesis applies a multivariate Poisson (MVP) model for the CCF modeling which distinguishes 
the components within the common cause component group (CCCG). Failures observed in the CCCG 
are decomposed into the superposition of several independent homogeneous Poisson processes 
(HPP). Empirical Bayes method is adopted to improve the estimation accuracy achieves a lower sum 
of squared error (SSE). In this way, all the possible failure scenarios of a specific component can be 
quantified, and the factors of traditional parametric models, such as the alpha factors, are easy to be 
obtained using the outcomes of the MVP model. This approach makes use of other components’ 
information within the same CCCG to resolve the limitation of data of a specific component within a 
nuclear power plant.  
Besides, since the current data mapping approaches are arguably useful in one way or another, 
empirical Bayes method will be combined with the traditional data mapping, which makes it 
relatively more rational to assimilate information from source plants for the target plant. This can be 
seen as an action to make use of other plants of different sizes by the means of statistics.  
1.5 Organization 
This thesis is divided into six chapters including this introductory one. In Chapter 2, the current 
approaches for CCF modeling are reviewed. Chapter 3 introduces statistical methods that can be 
applied to the estimation of the failure rates in nuclear power plants. One of the methods proposed by 
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different academics is regarded as optimal after some numerical examples and will be adopted in the 
chapters later. In chapter 4, concept and algorithm of the MVP model are described in detail. Monte 
Carlo simulation is utilized to evaluate the performances of different methods of modeling CCF.  
Chapter 5 presents a comparison between the combination of conventional data mapping with 
statistical method and the existing mapping approaches. An illustrative case study is included to 
explain the effectiveness of the recommended combination. In the last chapter, the main outcomes of 
the thesis are concluded and the remaining challenges need further investigations are pinpointed. The 
numerical calculation and Monte Carlo simulation are implemented using Excel spreadsheets or 
MATLAB functions developed by the author.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter first reviews the existing literature on the probabilistic models for the CCF assessment. 
Since most of the models have drawbacks one way or another, it is necessary to be familiar with the 
concepts, advantages and disadvantages in order to propose superior solutions.  
Furthermore, data mapping, as a common approach to make use of the data from source plants, is 
considered unsatisfactory for giving point estimates of failure rates with large uncertainties. Therefore, 
a comprehensive understanding of the theory is essential so that some improvement measures can be 
introduced in the Chapter 5.   
2.1 Parametric common cause failure models 
A variety of parametric CCF models have been developed in the past decades(Fleming, Mosleh and 
Deremer, 1986) such as the beta factor model, multiple Greek letter model, alpha factor model, just 
name a few. Some of them are easy to adopt and cover all the possible failure scenarios that happened 
in the nuclear industrial practice. However, an unavoidable fact is all of the models are highly 
dependent on their own assumptions, which is quite arguable regarding the reality. In the next 
sections, those methods will be introduced in details and given critical reviews respectively.  
2.1.1 Beta factor (BF) model and its generalization 
The BF model is one of the earliest for CCF modeling and originated from a report written by 
Fleming K. N. (1974). This method is presented to calculate the reliability of redundant system for the 
failure to start mode at first, and then extended to the failure to run mode.  
The BF model assumes that all the components fail when common cause occurs in a group of 𝑛 
components (group size is 𝑛). There are only two types of failures meaning that the probability of 
failure (or failure rate) of one component is either 𝜆𝜆1 due to independent causes or 𝜆𝜆𝑛 due to common 
causes. The key part in the model is to introduce a fraction of failure 𝛽𝑠 corresponding to CCF as 
defined in Equation 2.1. Then the total failure probability of a component 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 consists of two parts 
as shown in Equation 2.2.  
𝛽 =  𝜆𝜆𝑛
𝜆𝜆𝑛 + 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑁𝑛𝑁𝑛 + (𝑁1/𝑛) 2.1 
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𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛 + 𝜆𝜆1 =  𝑁𝑛 + (𝑁1/𝑛)𝑁  2.2 
The data required in the BF model are:  
𝑁1  = Number of independent failure events in the group.  
𝑁𝑛  = Number of failure events that simultaneously involve 𝑛 components in the group. 
𝑁   = Number of total demands applied to the group.  
For the case of estimating failure rates, rather than probability of failure, only the number 𝑁 should 
be replaced by the total system operation time 𝑇.  
The simplifying assumption of the BF model makes it easy to represent the failure consequences 
and to compute with the sole factor 𝛽 defined. However, when the group size 𝑛 is larger than 2, the 
assumption is obviously against the practical situations because the CCF is not necessarily involving 
all the components within the group. Besides, as a common defense application to prevent CCF, 
diverse components are often used in a CCCG. Then the number of independent failures of a 
particular component it is not the same as those of other components, i.e., 𝑁1,1 ≠ 𝑁1,2 ≠ 𝑁1/𝑛. And 
the data are not enough to support the point estimation. Sometimes the Bayesian theorem is 
recommended to solve the problem of lacking data while additional assumption of distribution is 
often brought in (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996).  
By the time when the analysts began to assess the CCF, the database available from the industry 
such as the Licensee Event Report (LER) did not count independent and multiple failures clearly. The 
application of the BF model met the obstacle of poor quality of data when quantifying the 𝛽 factor. 
Evans et al. (1983) presented a novel angle at which the dependent failure rate can be estimated. This 
method utilizes the same assumption of the BF model that a component fails either independently or 
simultaneously with all the other ones. The difference lies in the parameter definitions. The 
occurrence rate of common cause failure is regarded as a proportion of that of the independent failure 
by a factor 𝑃𝑐(𝜆𝜆𝑛 = 𝑃𝑐𝜆𝜆1). Since the independent failure rate is relatively easy to evaluate from the 
database, the total failure rate and CCF rate can be calculated.  
The proposed approach by Evans et al. gives an easy way to make use of the data of poor quality 
compared to the BF model. Unfortunately, the inherent limitations of the model’s assumption such as 
lack of data, inaccuracy of point estimation, and overmuch assumption, still exist and the calculation 
result is conservative.  
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In order to extend the BF model to more general cases in which multiple (1 < 𝑘 < 𝑛) components 
may fail at the same time. The multiple beta factor (MBF) model has been developed (Hokstad and 
Rausand, 2008). A set of factors 𝛽𝑖 are defined, each of which means the probability that a specific 
train 𝑖 + 1 fails given the trains 1 to 𝑖 have failed. 𝛽1 is the original parameter 𝛽 for two trains. The 
probability of failure of a group containing 𝑚 trains is calculated from the Equation 2.3 below.  
𝑄𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑛 = 𝐶𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑛𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 2.3 
The subscript 𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑛 refers to a 𝑘-out-of-𝑛 configuration meaning that at least 𝑘 trains failing at the 
same time will fails the whole system. Hokstad derives the expression of the key factor 𝐶𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑛 using 
the set of 𝛽𝑖 values and gives some examples of small size groups for comparison. Since it is much 
more complicated to obtain 𝐶𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑛 when 𝑛 is large (Hokstad, 2004), a simplification has been adopted, 
which assumes that 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽3(𝑖 ≥ 3). A base case is introduced as 𝛽2 = 0.3; 𝛽𝑖 = 0.5 when 𝑖 ≥ 3. 
This MBF model generalizes the basic BF model to the groups of larger sizes and enables all the 
possible failures existing in the nuclear industry. The factor 𝛽𝑖 can be seen as a portion of 𝛽𝑗−1 which 
makes sense because from qualitative investigation, an event involving three trains’ failure can 
certainly be regarded as one involving two trains’ failure while a two-train failure may not necessarily 
affect a third train. Hence, the dependency between 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖−1 ensures that the proportions of 2 to n-
component failures do not vary greatly from each other. 
However, since the configuration factors vary greatly given different beta values and these values 
are usually assumed according to the expert judgment regarding the past experience. It is critical to 
choose appropriate values in order to obtain a realistic prediction. This, unfortunately, is not included 
in the paper and is supposed to be paid more attention to in the further research. Furthermore, the 
assumption of conditional probability is robust to some extent and the simplification case lacks large 
quantities of practical data to support.  
2.1.2 Multiple Greek letter (MGL) model 
The MGL model is the most general extension of the BF model (Fleming and Kalinowski, 1983). A 
set of different parameters are defined according to the ratio of multi-component CCFs as shown in 
the followings. From these definitions below, it can be seen that the MGL model completely becomes 
the BF model for the 3-component group if 𝛾 = 1. More parameters can be assumed if necessary.  
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = Total failure rate for each component.  
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𝛽= Conditional probability that a component’s failure is shared by one or more additional 
components, given that the former component fails. 
𝛾= Conditional probability that a component’s failure is shared by two or more additional 
components, given that the former component fails together with one or more additional 
components. 
In order to estimate the parameters, the data required are the same as those for the BF model. The 
equations are shown below.  
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1𝑛𝑇�𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 2.4 
𝛽 = �𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑛
𝑖=2
/�𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 2.5 
𝛾 = �𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑛
𝑖=3
/�𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑛
𝑖=2
 2.6 
The advantages of the MGL model lie in that it covers all the possible failures as the MBF model 
does and that the factors are directly estimated from the data rather than dependent on robust 
assumptions like the MBF model. The drawback is that the data may not be sufficient to ensure the 
accuracy of many factors especially when the group size is large. Moreover, a problem of over-
parameterization occurs as the group size increases to a high level.  
2.1.3 Basic parameter (BP) model 
The BP model is either time-based (to calculate failure rates) or demand-based (to calculate 
probability of failure) according to Kumamoto and Henley (1996). The parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖  is failure-to-
operate rate for a particular group of 𝑖(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) components. Considering a three-component 
system for example, the rate of events involving exactly two components is thus 3𝜆𝜆2. From symmetry 
assumption that the probabilities of failures involving the same number of components are equal 
(e.g. 𝜆𝜆1,1 = 𝜆𝜆1,2 = 𝜆𝜆1,3), the independent and common cause failure rates depend only on the numbers 
of failures of different types. The required data are listed below and the formula of failure rate is 
given in Equation 2.7 (Fleming et al., 1986; Mosleh et al., 1989). 
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𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖�𝑛𝑖 �𝑇 2.7 
𝑇  = Total operation time of the system.  
𝑁𝑖 = Number of failure events involving exactly 𝑖 components in failed states. 
The basic parameter (BP) model is a straightforward approach to adopt with simple concepts. Since 
the components in various trains are tested differently and the testing scheme affects the CCF 
probabilities, it is necessary to investigate the formulas of CCF factors under different testing 
schemes. Hwang, M. J. and Kang, D. I. (2011) develops the calculation equations of CCF factors 
within a CCCG under the staggered testing scheme, non-staggered testing scheme and mixed testing 
scheme based on the BP model. It is a significant generalization of the BP model that makes the 
method more applicable in the CCF modeling.  
2.1.4 Binomial failure rate (BFR) model 
The binomial failure-rate (BFR) model is specialized from a general model proposed by Marshall and 
Olkin (1967). Due to the different causes, failures are divided into two types, namely independent 
failures and nonlethal shocks. The occurrence of the nonlethal shock follows the Poisson process with 
a rate 𝜇. Each component has a constant failure probability of 𝑝 under the shocks and the failure 
distribution is binomial (Vesely, 1977). Afterwards, Atwood developed the BFR model further and 
introduced lethal shock with rate 𝜔. The basic parameters are shown below: 
𝜆𝜆𝐼 = Independent failure rate for each component. 
𝜇 = Occurrence rate for nonlethal shocks. 
𝑝 = Probability of failure for each component under nonlethal shocks.  (𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝) 
𝜔 = Occurrence rate of lethal shocks. 
 The relations hold between the BP and BRF models as follows: 
𝜆𝜆1 = 𝜆𝜆𝐼 + 𝜇𝑝𝑞𝑛−1 2.8 
𝜆𝜆𝑘 = 𝜇𝑝𝑘𝑞𝑛−𝑘 
 
2.9 
𝜆𝜆𝑛 = 𝜇𝑝𝑛 + 𝜔 
 
2.10 
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A distinguished feature of this model is that the total number of parameters remains constant 
regardless of the number of components. Each event is classified as lethal or nonlethal (including 
independent cause) shock (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). However, 𝜇 cannot be estimated directly 
from the data recorded because nonlethal shocks do not necessarily cause visible failures. Only 
shocks that cause at least one component failure are counted. Hence, the rate of visible nonlethal 
shocks, 𝜇+, is regarded as a basic parameter instead of 𝜇. Then the expected total number of failures 
caused by nonlethal shocks is  
𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛 = 𝜇𝑇𝑛𝑝 = 𝜇+𝑇𝑛𝑝1 − 𝑞𝑛 = 𝑁+𝑛𝑝1 − 𝑞𝑛 
 
2.11 
Then the probability 𝑝 can be calculated by solving Equation 2.11. The other parameters are easy to 
estimate following the equations below 
𝜆𝜆𝐼 = 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑇 
 
2.12 
𝜇+ = 𝑁+𝑇  
 
2.13 
𝜔 = 𝑁𝐿
𝑇
 
 
2.14 
where 
𝑁𝐼 = Number of single-component failures due to independent cause. 
𝑁+ = Number of nonlethal shocks causing at least one component failure. 
𝑁𝐿 = Number of lethal shocks. 
This BFR model assumes a binomial distribution for the failure mechanism which describes the 
failure situations by the means of mathematics. Unfortunately, the practical situation is a black box 
that no one can predict. Even the components within a CCCG are not necessarily equally subjected to 
a nonlethal shock due to different location, internal structure, lifetime, manufactory, etc. Therefore 
the probability 𝑝 may not be a constant for all the components.  
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2.1.5 General multiple failure model 
General multiple failure model is based on the ratio of multi-component CCFs. Factors, 
𝛼1/𝑛,𝛼2/𝑛, … ,𝛼𝑛/𝑛 , correspond to CCF events of different orders. The alpha factors are easy to 
calculate and often used in practice. First, define some parameters as follows where 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝑛.  
𝑁𝑘/𝑛 = Number of failure events involving 𝑘 components in the 𝑛-component system. 
𝑇      = Operation time of the 𝑛-component system. 
𝜆𝜆𝑘/𝑛 = Rate of CCF events failing specific 𝑘 components in a 𝑛-component system. 
𝛬𝑘/𝑛 = Total rate of CCF events failing exactly 𝑘 components in a 𝑛-component system. 
𝛬𝑛     = Total rate of failure events occurred in the system. 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 = Alpha factor for 𝑘/𝑛 event, ratio of parameters.  
Based upon the above definitions, the relations among the parameters are illustrated as follows. 
𝛬𝑘/𝑛 = �𝑛𝑘� 𝜆𝜆𝑘/𝑛 = 𝑁𝑘/𝑛𝑇  2.15 
𝛬𝑛 = ��𝑛𝑘� 𝜆𝜆𝑘/𝑛𝑛
𝑘=1
= �𝛬𝑘/𝑛𝑛
𝑘=1
 2.16 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 = 𝛬𝑘/𝑛𝛬𝑛 = 𝑁𝑘/𝑛∑ 𝑁𝑘/𝑛𝑛𝑘=1  2.17 
From the definitions of the alpha factors, it can be seen that they are solely dependent on the ratios of 
multiple failures. All the possible failures can be evaluated using the parameters obtained from the 
data. If the database is not large enough, the parameter estimation is not likely to be reliable. The 
method of data mapping can be used to utilize data from other plants. This topic will be addressed in 
a later Section.   
2.1.6 Markov model 
All the models above are developed for non-repairable systems. As to the repairable systems, Markov 
transition diagrams are used with appropriate parameters: common cause occurrence rates 𝜆𝜆1~𝜆𝜆𝑛 and 
repair rate 𝜇 (Platz, 1984).  
  18 
Let 𝑃𝑖, a function of time, denote the probability of the state 𝑖. The probability can transit from state 
𝑖  to state  𝑗 . A transfer matrix 𝐴  consisting of 𝜆𝜆1~𝜆𝜆𝑛  and 𝜇can be formed, the element of which 
is 𝑎𝑖𝑗.The probability of transiting to state 𝑗 during the interval𝑑𝑡 is 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡. Then differential equations 
for 𝑃𝑖  can be written in the form of matrix. Then the probability 𝑃𝑖  can be calculated by solving the 
differential equations. 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡) =  𝐴𝑃𝑖  (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 2.18 
This thesis does not concentrate on solving differential equations as the Markov model does, 
although it is widely applied to describe the dependencies among the CCFs in redundant systems.  
2.1.7 Case study  
Data regarding diesel generator (CCCG = 4) failures are summarized in Table 2.1 (Becker et al., 
2009). Observation time is 2.91E6 (the unit is unknown in the report). CCF models discussed 
previously will be applied to compare their performance. Since BF model does not consider k out n 
failures, it is not included in the case study. In addition, Markov model is not employed either 
because no further information is available indicating that the systems are repairable or the failures 
are time-related. First, α factors are calculated following Equation 2.15 to 2.17. The results are listed 
in the table below.  
Table 2.1: Failure data of diesel generators in SKI Report 2009:07. 
𝑘 1 2 3 4 
𝑁𝑘/4 3 19 2 8 
𝛼𝑘/4 0.09375 0.59375 0.0625 0.25 
 
Second, the MGL, AF, BP, and BFR models are compared for estimating the k-out-of-4 failure rate. 
By following the formulas of each model, it is not difficult to obtain the component level and system 
level failure rates. Simplified expressions for the k-out-of-4 system level failure rates are able to 
obtain as well. The estimation of the system failure rates are listed below.  
An interesting phenomenon shows up that the MGL, AF and BP models produce the same 
estimates. This result stems from the fact that parameters of MGL and AF models are defined by 
those of BP model, and that in order to model the CCF, the basic parameters 𝜆𝜆𝑖  still need to be 
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calculated even for the former two models. Besides, the BFR model generates a higher estimate for 
the 4-out-of-4 failure rate. That is because non-lethal shock also contributes to the lethal failure with a 
probability of 𝑝.  
Table 2.2: Failure rates of k-out-of-4 events calculated by different models. 
Model 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 𝑘 = 4 
MGL 1.10E-05 9.96E-06 3.44E-06 2.75E-06 
AF 1.10E-05 9.96E-06 3.44E-06 2.75E-06 
BP 1.10E-05 9.96E-06 3.44E-06 2.75E-06 
BFR 1.09E-05 8.94E-06 6.61E-06 3.91E-06 
 
2.2 Unified partial method (UPM) and influence diagram (ID) extension 
Since the parametric models introduced above are not always accurate due to the over-simplifying 
assumption and the lack of available data respectively, the UK nuclear industry are currently adopting 
the unified partial method (UPM) which is based on the beta factor model and the cut-off 
methodology to assess the CCF in a novel way.  
2.2.1 Unified partial method (UPM) 
In the UPM common cause method (Zitrou and Bedford, 2003), the defenses against CCF are broken 
down into 8 sub-factors such as Operator Interaction, Redundancy, Analysis, etc. Each sub-factor has 
5 levels of strength (A, B, C, D, E) accompanied by corresponding scores from low to high.  
From the database, a beta factor for a specific system 𝑖  can be calculated using the following 
equation, 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖_𝑒𝑁𝑖_𝑐  2.19 
where 𝑁𝑖_𝑒 and 𝑁𝑖_𝑐  are the numbers of common cause events and failed components respectively. 
Next, a linear regression model as shown in Equation is assumed to investigate the relationships 
between the beta factor and the scores (𝑥𝑖𝑗) corresponding to the eight sub-factor levels.  
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑤1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑤2𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯+ 𝑤8𝑥𝑖8 2.20 
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After the weights (𝑤𝑖) have been determined, the dependencies of failure rate on the sub-factors are 
also revealed. And the failure rate of the system 𝜆𝜆𝑖 is assumed to be the sum of the eight scores𝑥𝑖.  
The advantage of the UPM is its ease of implementation framework. The steps are clear to follow 
and the calculation is not difficult; a number of tables are enough to obtain the scores of the sub-
factors for each system. However, the data required such as 𝑁𝑖_𝑒 and 𝑁𝑖_𝑐, and 𝑥𝑖 are not available at 
most times because not many countries are utilizing this method currently. The failure events and data 
may not be recorded in such a detail as the UPM expects and the scores have to be determined by the 
experts following some guides and past experience. Besides, any change of the design and age of the 
system are likely to require rescoring the system. A lot of qualitative analysis is required when 
analysts are assigning the scores. Moreover, the assumed linear relationship between failure rate and 
the scores needs further investigation. The levels of certain sub-factors may change the other factors’ 
impacts on CCF probability according to Zitrou and Bedford (2003).  
2.2.2 Influence diagram (ID) extension 
The Bayesian network (BN) model is a directed acyclic graph in which the nodes represent random 
variables and the directed arrows always point from parents to children. All the conditional 
probability functions (CPFs) for the variables are written in such a conditional way: 𝑓(𝑥𝑖|𝑝𝑎(𝑥𝑖)) 
where 𝑝𝑎(𝑥𝑖) means the parents of a variable 𝑥𝑖 have already happened. It is necessary to choose an 
appropriate family of distribution for each CPF and assign values to the parameters. In this process, 
empirical data and/or expert judgments may be utilized (Langseth and Portinale, 2007). 
An obvious advantage of the BN model lies in the flexibility of the formulation. The parent-child 
conditional structure enables analysts to add possible causes of failures into the model. What’s more, 
since the number of probabilities is reduced significantly, the data or expert judgments required are 
reduced which are usually expensive and difficult to obtain. The difficulty of the method is that the 
analyst should get inputs from the real experts because of the complexity of the networks. All the 
possible dependencies of the variables should be considered in order to reflect the practical situations. 
This makes it rather difficult to construct a BN structure.  
As an extension of the Bayesian network, influence diagram (ID) can be used to modify the UPM 
(Zitrou, Bedford and Walls, 2004). The ID contains different types of nodes (variables) such as 
decision node, uncertainty node and value node, which is more detailed compared to the BN. It has 
two major advantages in the CCF defense analysis. First, the ID graphically portrays the 
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dependencies among the defenses and the influences on the CCF probability. Second, the expert 
judgments can be taken into account together with the statistical data.  
The assumption made in the model is that the CCF event occurs in an independent homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP) with rate 𝛾𝑖 and hence the overall failure rate 𝜆𝜆 is the superposition of them. It 
is also assumed that the parameters of rates are uncertain variables rather than unknown constants.  
There are two factors causing CCFs, (i.e., root cause and coupling mechanisms, three defense 
actions are proposed aimed at reducing the frequency of root causes, or against the coupling 
mechanisms, or both. And the domain variables are classified to three types related to different 
objectives, namely defenses, root causes and coupling factors. Three scenarios are illustrated: a), 
decision variable describes the defense against the occurrence of root cause; b), decision variable 
describes the defense against the coupling factor; and c), decision variable describes the defense 
against both of them. 
Zitrou et al. (2007) further introduce the ID extension of the UPM afterwards. Two advantages are 
shown in the application of the ID, namely modeling non-linear dependencies amongst the defenses 
and taking account for expert judgments as an important source. First, functional interactions between 
any two defenses can be modeled by assuming parameters to represent impacts on a certain variable 
between different levels of the defenses. The relationships may be functionally independent, 
functionally dependent and threshold functionally dependent. Second, when constructing the ID 
network, every expert is expected to draw the relationships between defense, root cause and coupling 
mechanism variables individually. Then all the opinions are incorporated and disagreements can be 
discussed within the panel.  
One of the most important advantages of the ID is the capability of representing various kinds of 
information (e.g., root cause, coupling factor, defense, rate, etc.) by different types of variables. 
Besides, the dependencies between various defenses can be taken into account. Moreover, expert 
judgments are valued as an important resource. However, different interpretations, personal 
experience and ambiguities in definitions of the defenses may lead to different understandings of the 
interactions. This will lead to several rounds of reflections so that the experts in the panel can reach 
an agreement in the end.  
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2.3 Traditional data mapping 
Due to the rarity of failure data in nuclear power plants, it is essential to combine those from other 
component groups of various sizes. It is the data mapping that enables making use of the event data of 
a different size system. In practice, each event can be reinterpreted based on the components' status in 
the event such as complete failure, degraded, incipient, or working (Becker et al., 2007). The outcome 
of the reinterpretation is impact vector which is a set of probabilities of the possible failure scenarios 
which is the objectives of data mapping (Mosleh et al., 1989). Meanwhile, since the mapping process 
is purely mathematical, the utilization of the method is not only limited to the impact vector, but also 
applicable for many other kinds of data, such as number of failures, failure rates or even some CCF 
factors (Vaurio, 2007).  
Suppose a system of two MOVs is to be assessed but available data exist from another system of 
three MOVs. Then the estimated failure rates or number of failures of the 2-MOV CCCG depend on 
which specific two out of the three MOVs in the source group are selected (Kvam and Miller, 2002). 
Therefore, the data mapping is a purely mathematical approach based on the symmetry assumptions 
of the components such as identical design, separation and maintenance (Vaurio, 2007).  
Furthermore, since the size of source plant is not necessarily equal to the one of target plant, 
mapping can be specifically classified into two categories, mapping down and mapping up 
corresponding to whether the outer plant size is larger or smaller than the target. As to the plants of 
the same size, a simplifying assumption that they are identical contributes to easy computation and 
hence no more mapping is needed, unless convincing evidence shows that they are not identical in the 
performance. Since the thesis refers to externally caused CCF only, which is the majority of CCF at 
the present, the formulas of both the mappings are derived for the CCF of interest in the following.  
2.3.1 Mapping down 
The objectives of the mapping methods are the failure rates (it can also be number of failures) 
including both independent and common caused. As the same as before, they are denoted by 𝜆𝜆𝑘/𝑛 
which mean the rate of failure events simultaneously involving specific 𝑘  components within a 
CCCG of size 𝑛. The figure below illustrates the process of mapping failure rates from a system of 
size 2 to the rate of size 1 (Vaurio, 2007). Based on the previous definitions of component level and 
system level failure, we can come up with the relations  𝛬2/2 = 𝜆𝜆2/2 ,  𝛬1/2 = 2𝜆𝜆1/2  and𝛬1/1 =
𝜆𝜆1/1.The mapped rate of interest is calculated from Equation 2.21. 
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𝛬1/1 = 1
�21�
𝛬1/2 + 𝛬2/2 2.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mapping down CCF rates from n = 2 to 1. 
When this method is applied to larger systems, for example, mapping from known CCF rates of 
size 𝑛 to the rates of size 𝑛 − 1, the general equation is easy to find as shown in Equation 2.22. Its 
simplified expression is given in Equation  2.23.  1
�𝑛−1𝑘 �
𝛬𝑘/𝑛−1 = 1�𝑛𝑘� 𝛬𝑘/𝑛 + 1� 𝑛𝑘+1� 𝛬𝑘+1/𝑛 2.22 
𝛬𝑘/𝑛−1 = 𝑛 − 𝑘𝑛 𝛬𝑘/𝑛 + 𝑘 + 1𝑛 𝛬𝑘+1/𝑛 2.23 
Sometimes the size distance is equal or larger than 2. By the means of substitution, it is easy to 
derive the desired formulas, e.g., mapping from 𝑛 to 𝑛 − 2 using Equation 2.24.  1
�𝑛−2𝑘 �
𝛬𝑘/𝑛−2 = 1�𝑛𝑘� 𝛬𝑘/𝑛 + 2� 𝑛𝑘+1� 𝛬𝑘+1/𝑛 + 1� 𝑛𝑘+2� 𝛬𝑘+2/𝑛 2.24 
Kvam and Miller (2002) derive a more generalized form of traditional mapping down formula 
without any substitutions in the calculation shown in Equation 2.25. NUREG/CR-4780 gives several 
mapping down formulas commonly used which are also listed in Table 2.3 below. They also verify 
the derived equations above.  
𝛬𝑘/𝑛′ = �𝐶𝑘,𝑟𝛬𝑟/𝑛𝑛
𝑟=1
   𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑘 = 1, … ,𝑛′) 2.25 
1 2 
𝜆𝜆2/2 
𝜆𝜆1/2 𝜆𝜆1/2 
1 
𝜆𝜆2/2 
𝜆𝜆1/2 
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𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝐶𝑘,𝑟 = �𝑟𝑘�� 𝑛−𝑟𝑛′−𝑘�� 𝑛𝑛′�     (𝑘 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑛′ + 𝑘) 
Table 2.3: Formulas for mapping down failure rates for systems of size 1 to 4. 
  Size of system mapping to 
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𝛬1/3 = 34𝛬1/4 + 12𝛬2/4 
𝛬2/3 = 12𝛬2/4 + 34𝛬3/4 
𝛬3/3 = 14𝛬3/4 + 𝛬4/4 
𝛬1/2 = 12𝛬1/4 + 23𝛬2/4 + 12𝛬3/4 
𝛬2/2 = 16𝛬2/4 + 12𝛬3/4 + 𝛬4/4 
𝛬1/1 = 14𝛬1/4 + 12𝛬2/4 + 34𝛬3/4+ 𝛬4/4 
3  
𝛬1/2 = 23𝛬1/3 + 23𝛬2/3 
𝛬2/2 = 13𝛬2/3 + 𝛬3/3 𝛬1/1 =
13𝛬1/3 + 23𝛬2/3 + 𝛬3/3 
2   𝛬1/1 = 12𝛬1/2 + 𝛬2/2 
 
2.3.2 Mapping up 
According to the derivations, it is clear that mapping down is rather deterministic, which means that 
given a set of failure rates of a larger system, the ones of a smaller system are straightforward to be 
estimated by following the formulas presented above. However, when it comes to mapping up, the 
estimation of failure rates from a small system to a larger one is not deterministic and extra 
uncertainties are unavoidable.  
Before mapping up, recall several concepts introduced in the BFR model, which are independent 
failures, nonlethal and lethal shocks. The first type refers to the failure event in which only one 
component is failed and no correlations with others are shown. Since the number of independent 
failure is simply proportional to the size of the CCCG, it is reasonable to map the failure rates from 
small groups to large groups solely based on their sizes. In contrast, the lethal shock occurs resulting 
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in all the 𝑛 components being in the state of failure regardless the size of the system. In other words, a 
CCCG is regarded as a whole and the lethal shock then follows a constant occurrence rate when 
impacting each of the CCCGs. In addition to the above two, the nonlethal shock causes multiple, 
more than 1 and less than 𝑛, components to fail. Each component is likely to fail with a probability 
of 𝜌, given a nonlethal shock which has a constant occurrence rate impacting a CCCG. Therefore, 
when the analysts map the failure rates up from small to large size, the uncertainty lies in the 
estimation of the parameter 𝜌, the probability of failing one more hypothetical component attached to 
the current system. Table 2.4 reveals the commonly used formulas of mapping up when the size is 
from 1 to 4.  
Table 2.4: Formulas for mapping up failure rates for systems of size 1 to 4. 
  Size of system mapping to 
  2 3 4 
Si
ze
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 m
ap
pi
ng
 fr
om
 
1 
𝛬1/2 = 2(1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/1 
𝛬2/2 = 𝜌𝛬1/1 
𝛬1/3 = 3(1 − 𝜌)2𝛬1/1 
𝛬2/3 = 3𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/1 
𝛬3/3 = 𝜌2𝛬1/1 
𝛬1/4 = 4(1 − 𝜌)3𝛬1/1 
𝛬2/4 = 6𝜌(1 − 𝜌)2𝛬1/1 
𝛬3/4 = 4𝜌2(1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/1 
𝛬4/4 = 𝜌3𝛬1/1 
2  
𝛬1/3 = 32 (1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/2 
𝛬2/3 = 𝜌𝛬1/2 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛬2/2 
𝛬3/3 = 𝜌𝛬2/2 
𝛬1/4 = 2(1 − 𝜌)2𝛬1/2 
𝛬2/4 = 52𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/2 + (1 − 𝜌)2𝛬2/2 
𝛬3/4 = 𝜌2𝛬1/2 + 2𝜌(1 − 𝜌)𝛬2/2 
𝛬4/4 = 𝜌2𝛬2/2 
3   
𝛬1/4 = 43 (1 − 𝜌)𝛬1/3 
𝛬2/4 = 𝜌𝛬1/3 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛬2/3 
𝛬3/4 = 𝜌𝛬2/3 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛬3/3 
𝛬4/4 = 𝜌𝛬3/3 
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The calculation process of mapping up is straightforward to implement. However, the parameter 𝜌 
is assumed for all the scenarios in all the system sizes, which is quite arguable regarding the practical 
situation. Furthermore, the transition of the assumption from the BFR model to mapping up 
computation is not necessarily reflecting the reality all the time. This assumption is robust and the 
inherent failure mechanism is complicated and never known to the analysts.  
2.4 Newly developed data mapping 
Based on the introduction of data mapping above, it can be seen that the tradition method has several 
drawbacks. First, the data of each resource group can be mapped to a set of rates of the target group 
size. But the newly mapped sets of failure rates are rather different from each other. This fact relates 
to the fact that the configurations and designs of diverse size systems are usually inconsistent. Hence 
the mapping process simply based on probability is arguable because of the defect of inherent 
assumptions. Second, since the data of the source plants are not necessarily enough, it is a promising 
attempt to assimilate each other’s information by some sort of means, other than taking the average of 
them. Third, though this thesis does not focus on the component-caused CCF, it is still of interest to 
extend the data mapping from the external caused CCF to this type. In the following sections, some 
recently developed approaches will be addressed.  
2.4.1 Data mapping proposed by Kvam and Miller 
Kvam and Miller (2002) propose a novel angle from which the database can be enlarged by making 
use of other source plants in the data mapping. In the traditional method, the failure rates of the large 
system are transformed down to the smaller target one by modifying the rates directly according to 
the number of components in each system. In further detail, the times of operation are fixed to the 
practical values while the numbers of failures are mapped based on the ratio of source size to target 
size. In contrast, the proposed approach is to modify time intervals given that the numbers of failures 
are known and unchanged. This is an inverse process of the traditional one. The core assumption is 
that all the failures are recorded from a typical system following a homogeneous Poisson process 
(HPP) in different time intervals. Therefore, by dividing the summation of numbers of failures of 
different plants by the summation of their times, one can obtain a more reliable result with greatly 
enlarged time of operation compared to the one calculated from the individual plant itself.  
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An example is given accompanied to the description of the method (Kvam and Miller, 2002). 
Numbers of the different types of failures and the operation times for each size system are listed in 
Table 2.5. The failure rate type indicates the failure scenario 𝑘/𝑛.  
Table 2.5: Common cause failure data for EDGs 
Size Failure Type Number Time 
2 1/2 17 75 
2/2 14 75 
3 
1/3 9 50 
2/3 5 50 
3/3 6 50 
4 
1/4 11 50 
2/4 10 50 
3/4 7 50 
4/4 6 50 
5 
1/5 2 10 
2/5 2 10 
3/5 1 10 
4/5 2 10 
5/5 1 10 
 
Suppose the 2-component group to be the target and the rate under study is 𝛬2/2 as indicated in the 
table. For each of the sizes, a mapped time is calculated by the means proposed by Kvam and Miller. 
The mapped result 𝛬2/2 can be obtained by the total number of failure over total modified time which 
turns out to be 0.0610. The computation results are shown in Table 2.6. For comparison, the 
traditional mapping down is also utilized to generate the target rate 𝛬2/2 for each size listed in the 
right column.  
The new approach holds an original inverse view on the data from CCCGs of various sizes 
compared to the conventional mapping down process. The strong and robust assumption extends the 
time interval to a large magnitude and makes the result seem more reliable. However, the internal 
assumption may be fundamentally against the nature and hence leads the mapping result to be 
completely wrong. Mathematically, the four systems are likely to be following different HPPs 
because the traditional mapped 𝛬2/2 for them are not identical (0.1867, 0.1533, 0.2233, 0.27). The 
typical HPP with a mean failure rate of 0.0610 is rare to generate four samples whose mean rates are 
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much larger than the true one. And as a matter of fact, it is irrational to believe that identical 
configuration is designed for each of the systems. This fact makes the assumption less trust worth. 
Anyway, if there is further convincing information to support typical HPP assumption, or the group 
sizes are close, then this method of mapping failure rates is still reasonable to apply.  
Table 2.6: Transformed time on test for EDG failure data 
Size 𝑘/𝑛 Number Time (year) Mapping Modifier Modified Time (year) Traditional Mapped 𝛬2/2 
2 1/2 17 75 0 0   
2/2 14 75 1 75 0.1867 
3 
1/3 9 50 0 0   
2/3 5 50 0.3333 150   
3/3 6 50 1 50 0.1533 
4 
1/4 11 50 0 0   
2/4 10 50 0.1667 300   
3/4 7 50 0.5 100   
4/4 6 50 1 50 0.2233 
5 
1/5 2 10 0 0   
2/5 2 10 0.1 100   
3/5 1 10 0.3 33.3333   
4/5 2 10 0.6 16.6667   
5/5 1 10 1 10 0.2700 
 
2.4.2 Data mapping proposed by Vaurio 
Vaurio (2007) derives the mapping up and down equations corresponding to both types of CCFs, 
external caused CCF and component-caused CCF, respectively. The results of external caused CCF 
are consistent with Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 which have been given by Mosleh et al. (1989).  
Mapping up from 𝑛 − 1 to 𝑛  involves a new parameter 𝜂𝑛−1,𝑛 . The value of this parameter is 
unknown but can be estimated from empirical alpha factors. The various empirical alpha factors for 
different types of components, failure modes and system sizes turn out to be different as well 
(Marshall, Rasmuson and Mosleh, 1998). Compared to the traditional mapping up process which 
utilizes a single extra parameter 𝜌, the introduction of 𝜂𝑛−1,𝑛  is making more sense and does not 
completely rely on expert judgments as 𝜌 does. Besides, Vaurio gives a suggestion about treating 
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plants of same size, Bayesian update. This, however, requires a sufficient database and is rather 
complicated, while a wiser choice is to consider them as identical ones. This treatment sums the 
failures and observation times respectively and hence makes the database larger and greatly simplifies 
the calculations (Vaurio, 2008). Moreover, based on the mapping equations of failure rates and the 
definitions of alpha factor and 𝜂𝑛−1,𝑛, the alpha factors can also be mapped up/down amongst plants 
of different sizes. In the end, although it is unnecessary to apply Bayesian method to the systems of 
the same size, it is worth an attempt to extend the Bayesian update to the ones of different sizes. This 
will make use of other sources and at the same time respect the data of the target its own.  
2.5 Summary 
According to the reviews above, there are two aspects that need further investigation, proposing an 
advanced model to assess the reliability of a system of CCCG and borrowing data information from 
other size systems in order to enrich the database under study.  
Most of the existing parametric models rely on strong assumptions one way or another. These 
assumptions are not always following the unknown nature of the failure. When the CCCG size 
becomes large, some models such as the MGL model have to estimate many parameters, which are 
faced with a problem of lacking enough data. The UPM and its ID extension are good applications to 
the CCF modeling but lots of reliable expert judgments are required to ensure the accuracy of the 
results. That makes it difficult for a less experienced analyst to adopt them in practice.  
Since the CCF data are sparse, there is a demand to make good use of the data from other plants 
which are often of different sizes. The traditional data mapping generates a group of failure rates from 
the source plants of various sizes to the target plant. But there are no further instructions about how to 
merge these mapped rates from different sizes. Also, the assumed parameter for mapping up should 
not be a constant. The recently developed methods have some defects of inherent assumption (Kvam 
and Miller, 2002), or lack a clear solution to make use of the data from various plants (Vaurio, 2007).  
Hence, there need to be a new approach to solve the existing problems.   
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Chapter 3 
Statistical Approaches for Failure Rate Estimation 
Since the existing CCF models only generate point estimates for the failure rates and common cause 
factors, it is necessary to explore some superior approaches which give confidence intervals or even 
the distributions for the factors to be evaluated. Furthermore, assimilating data information from other 
components, systems or plants is an effective measure to make up the drawbacks of sparse CCF data. 
These requirements can be met by the means of statistical approaches. This chapter introduces the 
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the failure rate, James-Stein estimator and its application to 
the failure rate estimation, and then the commonly utilized empirical Bayes method and the 
developments for the topic under study. Two numerical examples will be given to investigate the 
similarity and diversity of these methods and to choose the optimal one to be adopted in this thesis.  
3.1 Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) 
The maximum likelihood estimate is one of the simplest methods in statistics. In the case of failure to 
run, the parameter needs to be estimated is failure rate, which is the ratio of number of failures and 
operation time. Failure to run event can be modeled by a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP). Some 
agreements are made: a) the occurrence of failure is independent identically distributed, b) repair time 
is negligible and c) the failure rate follows exponential distribution (Pandey and Jyrkama, 2012). 
According to Crowder et al.(1991), the MLE and its standard error are  
?̂?𝜆𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖  3.1 
𝜎�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = �𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖2 3.2 
The above approach is defined as MLE in this thesis and estimates the failure rate of a single 
component. If more failure data are available from other components, there are many other statistical 
methods to make use of outer components' data to estimate the target one. James-Stein estimator and 
empirical Bayes method are two of them and will be introduced later in this chapter.  
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3.2 James-Stein estimators 
3.2.1 Basic concepts 
The James-Stein (JS) estimator was first proposed (James and Stein, 1961) to solve multivariate 
normal distribution problem. The estimator is written in terms of an overall average and the distance 
from the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) to the average multiplied by corresponding fractions. 
By the means of mathematical transformation, the estimates of the different components, expressed in 
the form of  𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝜇 + (1 − 𝐵𝑖)𝑁𝑖/𝑇𝑖 , are shrunk from the MLE ?̂?𝜆𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖/𝑇𝑖  towards an overall 
average 𝜇.The effect of shrinkage is reflected by the factors 𝐵𝑖 which are related to the variances of 
the normal random variables.  
An example of baseball hit rate was used (Efron and Morris, 1975) to show the shrinking effect of 
the JS estimator. Numbers of hits and tries for 18 players early in 1970 season are listed in the second 
and third columns of Table 3.1 below. The JS estimator is utilized to predict each player's true hit rate 
which can be taken as the average throughout the whole season. It can be seen that the JS estimator 
always gives the estimation results between the overall average and the MLE. To illustrate more 
clearly, the calculation results are plotted in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Example of baseball hit rate 
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James-Stein estimator dominates the MLE in terms of expected total squared error with a lower (or 
at least equal) risk than that of the MLE. This method is more accurate than the method of MLE 
because it always produces results between the overall mean and point estimates. It takes account of 
other components’ data as a larger database instead of using its own. The sums of squared errors for 
the MLE and James-Stein estimator are 0.0755 and 0.0214 respectively, which validate the superior 
to the MLE.  
Table 3.1: Example of baseball hit rate 
Player Hits Tries Overall average MLE James-Stein True 
1 18 45 0.265 0.4 0.294 0.346 
2 17 45 0.265 0.378 0.289 0.298 
3 16 45 0.265 0.356 0.285 0.276 
4 15 45 0.265 0.333 0.28 0.222 
5 14 45 0.265 0.311 0.275 0.273 
6 14 45 0.265 0.311 0.275 0.27 
7 13 45 0.265 0.289 0.27 0.263 
8 12 45 0.265 0.267 0.266 0.21 
9 11 45 0.265 0.244 0.261 0.269 
10 11 45 0.265 0.244 0.261 0.23 
11 10 45 0.265 0.222 0.256 0.264 
12 10 45 0.265 0.222 0.256 0.256 
13 10 45 0.265 0.222 0.256 0.303 
14 10 45 0.265 0.222 0.256 0.264 
15 10 45 0.265 0.222 0.256 0.226 
16 9 45 0.265 0.2 0.252 0.286 
17 8 45 0.265 0.178 0.247 0.316 
18 7 45 0.265 0.156 0.242 0.2 
 
3.2.2 Vaurio's James-Stein estimator  
The James-Stein estimator is not only limited to normal or binomial variables, but also applicable to 
some other unknown distributed variables. Vaurio and Jänkälä (1992) have derived the JS estimator 
for failure rates based on Poisson data.  
At first, the authors assume that the𝑛 failure rates 𝜆𝜆𝑖  are independent realizations of a random 
variable 𝜆𝜆 with a probability density of 𝜋(𝜆𝜆). The form of the distribution is not necessary to be 
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known. Afterwards, through the moment method, the expected mean and variance of the MLE for 
each of the components are derived in terms of population mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2as shown below.  
𝐸(𝜆𝜆𝑖) = 𝜇 3.3 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜆𝜆𝑖) = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 𝜎2 3.4 
In order to better estimate the population mean and variance, the authors propose an unbiased 
weighted average estimator of 𝜇, denoted by 𝑚.  
𝑚 = �𝑤𝑖 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  3.5 
The mean and variance of this estimator are then calculated as Equation 3.6 and 3.7. 
𝐸(𝑚) = 𝜇�𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.6 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚) = �𝑤𝑖2𝑛
𝑖=1
�𝜎2 + 𝜇
𝑇𝑖
� 3.7 
By minimizing 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚) under the constraint of  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = 1, a set of optimal weights are obtained as 
shown in  
𝑤𝑖𝑜 = 1𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝜎2 �� 1𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝜎2𝑛𝑗=1 �
−1
 3.8 
The population mean and variance in the equation above can be substituted by 𝑚𝑜 and 𝑉𝑜.  
𝑚𝑜 = �𝑤𝑖𝑜 𝑁𝑖 𝑇𝑖⁄𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.9 
𝑉𝑜 = 11 − ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑜2𝑛𝑖=1 �𝑆 − 𝑚𝑜�𝑤𝑖𝑜(1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑜)𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 � 3.10 
𝑆 = �𝑤𝑖𝑜(𝑁𝑖 𝑇𝑖⁄ − 𝑚𝑜)2𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.11 
Following the iteration procedure from Equation 3.8 to 3.11, the optimal  𝑤𝑖 , 𝜇  and 𝜎2  can be 
obtained until 𝑚𝑜, 𝑉𝑜 and𝑤𝑖𝑜 converge.  
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The James-Stein estimator of the failure rate is written in the form of  
𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝜇 + (1 − 𝐵𝑖)𝑁𝑖/𝑇𝑖 3.12 
By minimizing the expected mean squared error of the JS estimator for each of the 𝑛 components, a 
set of corresponding shrinkage factors 𝐵𝑖 are selected.  
𝐵𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎2𝑇𝑖 3.13 
Note that the authors claim that the optimal weights for calculating the population mean and variance 
are also optimal to minimize the mean squared error for each component. Detailed derivation is given 
in Appendix A.  
An advantage of the JS estimator lies in the capability of achieving lower sum of squared errors 
(SSE) compared to the MLE. This fact means that the JS estimator is more accurate than the 
conventional point estimate and will be validated in the numerical example later in this chapter. In 
addition, this specific approach developed by Vaurio and Jänkälä still produces only an estimate of 
the failure rate. It is hard to estimate a confidence interval or distribution. A novel point of the JS for 
estimating failure rates lies in taking the view point of Bayesian statistics more or less, although the 
JS is regarded as Frequentist statistics at all the times. The difference is that failure rate is an outcome 
of a population distribution while the form of the distribution does not have to be specified. However, 
it would be better if one could give a distribution to visually illustrate the variation trend of the failure 
rates to be estimated. In order to achieve this goal, empirical Bayes would be an appropriate method.  
3.3 Empirical Bayes method 
Bayesian method is an effective approach to describe the variability of an objective and makes use of 
the specific data to generate a more reliable distribution named as posterior. In this section, some 
basic concepts of Bayesian and empirical Bayes (EB) will be introduced. Afterwards, two EB 
algorithms developed by different scholars are will be presented.  
3.3.1 Basic concepts 
In Bayesian Method, the unknown failure rate 𝜆𝜆  is assumed to be produced from a prior 
distribution 𝜋(𝜆𝜆), which is usually determined according to past experience, expert judgment and so 
on. The likelihood function of an event for a given failure rate 𝜆𝜆 can be expressed as 𝑝(𝑥|𝜆𝜆). The 
purpose of the method is to calibrate the failure rate distribution with the help of gained data. In order 
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to achieve this, a marginal distribution density function which has nothing to do with the parameter 𝜆𝜆 
is defined:  
𝑚(𝑥) = �𝑝(𝑥|𝜆𝜆)𝜋(𝜆𝜆)𝑑𝜆𝜆 3.14 
Then the posterior distribution is the updated distribution based on the available data and calculated 
from the following equation:  
𝑝(𝜆𝜆|𝑥) = ℎ(𝑥, 𝜆𝜆)
𝑚(𝑥) = 𝑝(𝑥|𝜆𝜆)𝜋(𝜆𝜆)∫𝑝(𝑥|𝜆𝜆)𝜋(𝜆𝜆)𝑑𝜆𝜆 3.15 
Since the posterior has taken both of the prior judgment and sample data into account, it can be 
regarded as a calibration of the knowledge of the unknown parameter 𝜆𝜆 after obtaining the data. 
Hence, the posterior is believed to be more accurate and closer to the truth (Mao, 1999).  
The choice of prior distribution is vitally important for the accuracy of posterior. The posterior 
distribution can be seen as a compromise between prior and data. If the prior is too far from the 
reality reflected by data, the posterior may probably have two peaks. If no information is available for 
prior, it is reasonable to choose a non-informative prior such as uniform prior. Then the posterior 
solely depends on the data. Moreover, selecting a prior distribution from a family which is conjugate 
to the likelihood function leads to a posterior distribution belonging to the same family of 
distribution. The conjugate prior contributes to a convenient calculation of the posterior (Carlin and 
Louis, 2000). Some common conjugate priors and corresponding likelihood distributions, either 
discrete or continuous, are listed in Table 3.2. In the reliability assessment field where Poisson data 
are collected, a gamma prior distribution is usually assumed. A broad consensus has been reached, 
upon which the EB algorithms developed by different researchers are based.  
Table 3.2: Common conjugate prior and likelihood distributions 
Likelihood Distribution Conjugate Prior 
Negative Binomial Beta 
Poisson Gamma 
Normal Normal 
Gamma Gamma 
Log-Normal Gamma/Normal 
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Empirical Bayes (EB) method in general can be seen as an approximation to a fully Bayesian 
inference procedure of a hierarchical model in which the hyper-parameters of the prior distribution 
are estimated from the data per se (Carlin and Louis, 2000), rather than from other sources such as 
expert judgments. It works the best when there are several 'similar' inferential groups, which are 
somehow related to each other and nevertheless each has its own unknown feature. For example, in 
probabilistic risk analysis of nuclear power plants, failure rates of piping at different pipe size are 
combined together for statistical inference to improve the statistical power. This is different from a 
simple pooled analysis in which all pipe segments are assumed homogeneous. In EB, the unique 
nature of each pipe segment is respected while other components of variation are treated and modeled 
together to improve the inference efficiency. 
The EB method has been used to estimate failure rates, although originally not for CCF. Consider a 
group of 𝑛 components. For each of them, its failure is modeled by a homogeneous Poisson process 
with a failure rate which probably is different from that of the other components. Each component has 
experienced 𝑁𝑖  failures in a time interval of length  𝑇𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑛 . The objective is to 
estimate an accurate failure rate𝜆𝜆𝑖for component𝑖. For this purpose, the Bayesian estimation method 
assumes a gamma prior distribution for the failure rate as 
𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖) = 𝛽𝛼𝜆𝜆𝑖𝛼−1𝑒−𝛽𝜆𝑖𝛤(𝛼)    , 𝜆𝜆𝑖 ,𝛼,𝛽 > 0 3.16 
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the hyper-parameters. The gamma prior is adopted because it is flexible to fit 
different types of data and conjugate to the Poisson likelihood as 
𝐿[𝑁𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖 ,𝑇𝑖] = 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖)𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑖!  3.17 
Hence the corresponding posterior distribution of the failure rate is also a gamma distribution (Carlin 
and Louis, 2000): 
𝑝(𝜆𝜆𝑖|𝑁𝑖 ,𝑇𝑖) = (𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)(𝛼+𝑁𝑖)𝜆𝜆𝑖𝛼+𝑁𝑖−1𝑒−(𝛽+𝑇𝑖)𝜆𝑖𝛤(𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)    , 𝜆𝜆𝑖 ,𝛼,𝛽 > 0 3.18 
This property makes the computation of posterior rather straightforward: the hyper-parameters 
become 𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖 and 𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖. The estimated failure rate can be expressed by the mean of the posterior 
distribution as a point estimate and the uncertainty is summarized by the variance of the posterior; 
they are, 
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𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = (𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)/(𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖) 3.19 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝜆𝑖) = (𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)/(𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)2 3.20 
So far, this approach is called fully Bayesian if the hyper-parameters α and β are determined 
through expert judgment or other procedures that rely on historical data or other information. The 
above procedure is called empirical Bayesian if the same data of the components are used to estimate 
the hyper-parameters.  
3.3.2 Vaurio's EB method  
Vaurio (1987) proposes a procedure to estimate the hyper-parameters using a moment matching 
method. More specifically, since the mean and variance of the prior are able to be expressed as 𝛼/𝛽 
and 𝛼/𝛽2, if one can calculate them accurately, then 𝛼 and 𝛽 are obtained as well. 
A set of normalized weight 𝑤𝑖 are introduced into the procedure which sum up to one. A weighted 
average of the sample mean 𝑀0 is calculated by the following equation: 
𝑀0 = �𝑤𝑖𝑁𝑖/𝑇𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.21 
which is an unbiased estimate of the true mean of prior distribution, denoted as 𝑀. 
The variance of the sample mean is calculated as  
𝑉0 = 𝑆 + 𝑀0/𝑇∗ 3.22 
where 
𝑆 = 1/(1 −�𝑤𝑖2𝑛
𝑖=1
)�𝑤𝑖(𝑁𝑖/𝑇𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
− 𝑀0)2 3.23 
𝑇∗ = �𝑇𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
− 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑇𝑖) 3.24 
in order to avoid the problem caused by identical data that the component with largest observation 
time has the highest precision while the others do not. 
Based on the method of moments, the author concludes that 𝑉0 is a biased estimate of the true 
variance 𝑉 and derives the variance of the estimated sample mean as follows.  
  38 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑀0) = 𝑉�𝑤𝑖2𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑀�(𝑤𝑖2/𝑇𝑖)𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.25 
The normalized weights are generated by minimizing the variance of sample mean as shown above. 
The formula is 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖/�𝑢𝑗𝑛
𝑗=1
 3.26 
where 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖/(𝑇𝑖 + 𝑀0/𝑉0) 3.27 
However, since the true values of 𝑀 and 𝑉 are never known in practice, one can use the estimates 
of them, 𝑀0 and 𝑉0, and iterate from Equation 3.21 to 3.27 with a set of initial weights as 𝑤𝑖 = 1/𝑛. 
When 𝑀0, 𝑉0 and 𝑤𝑖  converge, the iteration can be terminated and the values of 𝑀0 and 𝑉0can be 
seen as the real ones of 𝑀 and 𝑉. With the converged prior mean and variance, calculation procedures 
of 𝛼 and 𝛽 have been given as follows according to Vaurio (1987).  
𝛽 = 𝑀/𝑉 3.28 
𝛼 = 𝑀2/𝑉 + 0.5𝛽/𝑇∗ 3.29 
There is a similarity between the EB and JS estimators. First, transform the posterior mean of the 
EB estimator into the form of stein estimator.  
𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖 = 𝛼𝛽 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 𝑇𝑖𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖  3.30 
According to the prior distribution, the mean and variance are expressed as M = α/β and V = α/β2. 
Then the hyper-parameter can be obtained in the form of the statistical characters as  β = M/V. 
Substitute β  into the equation above, one can come up with a new expression without hyper-
parameters.  
𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑀 𝑀 𝑇𝑖⁄𝑀 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝑉 + 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 𝑉𝑀 𝑇𝑖⁄ + 𝑉 3.31 
Based on the derivations given by Vaurio (1987), M Ti⁄  can be seen as the variance of likelihood 
distribution while V is the variance of prior distribution. Therefore, the EB estimator mean value can 
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be expressed in the form of a balance between the overall average and MLE with weights determined 
by the magnitudes of prior and likelihood's variances.  
𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑀 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) + 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) 3.32 
Second, recall the formulas of the JS estimator given in 3.12 and 3.13. The estimator is also able to 
be written as a balance between overall average and MLE as shown in Equation 3.33 below. The 
fractions in this formula are also proportions taken by likelihood and prior in the total variance based 
on the derivations in the literature (Vaurio and Jänkälä, 1992) and they are exactly the same with 
those in the EB mean value expression.  
𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎2𝑇𝑖 + 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 𝜎2𝑇𝑖𝜇 + 𝜎2𝑇𝑖 = 𝜇 𝜇 Ti⁄𝜇 Ti⁄ + 𝜎2 + 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 𝜎2𝜇 Ti⁄ + 𝜎2 3.33 
As a conclusion, there is a close connection between the EB and JS estimators, although the JS 
estimator does not need to specify the exact form of prior distribution of the failure rates.  
3.3.3 Quigley-Bedford-Walls (QBW) EB procedure 
In order to estimate the rate of derailment, a statistical estimation procedure has been proposed by 
Quigley, Bedford and Walls (2007). The same HPP and gamma assumptions are made in this 
approach as those in Vaurio's EB estimator and result in a gamma posterior distribution. For 
convenience of presentation, it is called QBW procedure hereafter.  
Quigley et al. treat the data of all the components equally as their numbers of failures and 
corresponding time intervals are summed up in the calculation procedure. Hyper-parameters, as given 
in Equation 3.34 are calculated through two middle terms 𝑈 and 𝑊. The method of moment is used 
(Arnold, 1990) in the estimation process of these middle terms, Equation 3.35. The details are 
presented in the Appendix B.  
𝛼 = 𝑈2
𝑊 − 𝑈2
   , 𝛽 = 𝑈
𝑊 −𝑈2
 3.34 
                  𝑈 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
    , 𝑊 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑇𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 3.35 
This paper proposes an empirical Bayes method to solve the problem existing in reliability analysis: 
lack of data. Normally an accurate evaluation cannot be guaranteed unless a lot of data are available. 
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With the help of this method, researchers can calculate a relatively more reliable estimation of rate of 
occurrence based on the limited available data. Since common cause failure (CCF) is also a rare event 
similar to derailment in the paper, it is worth trying to adopt the EB in the estimation of the failure 
rate by replacing the miles and numbers of derailment events by operation times and numbers of 
CCFs respectively.  
Unlike the Vaurio's EB procedure, the newly developed one (QBW EB procedure) does not 
distinguish the components under study. As can be seen from the formulas, all the data collected are 
treated equally. In other words, the QBW EB method is more applicable for identical or similar 
components.  
Since 𝛼 and 𝛽 must be positive, the relation 𝑊 > 𝑈2 is supposed to hold all the time. However, 
given certain industrial data, the requirement is not always satisfied, which means the applicability of 
QBW EB is somehow dependent on the data. To investigate the percentage of data that can be 
processed by QBW EB method, Monte Carlo simulation is utilized. Six components are assumed who 
have the same failure rate (0.001) and operation time (1000). The data are generated from the Poisson 
process. The percentage of data that fit the algorithm versus the number of trials is plotted in Figure 
3.2 below. It can be seen that given large quantities of trials, the percentage finally stabilized at a 
rather low level.  
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of data fitting QBW EB 
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Next, change the value of the assumed failure rates to check the relationship between the 
percentage and the magnitude of rate. Results have been plotted in Figure 3.3 below. If the failure rate 
is in the range of 0 to 0.01, the percentage of the data fitting QBW’s model increases as the rate 
increase, whereas as the failure rate is larger than 0.01, the percentage is stabilized. 
The above simulations are rather arbitrary because the failure rate, operation time, number of trials, 
number of components in the group are all randomly assumed. Further investigation is essential to 
reveal the inherent relationships between the percentage and the factors such as a) whether the 
percentage relates to the number of component in the group, b) the effect of components having 
different failure rates, and c) the impact of different operation times. However, the improvement of 
the method is not the focus of the thesis. QBW EB is merely an alternative to evaluate the failure 
rates of CCFs.  
 
Figure 3.3: Percentage of data versus the value of failure rate. 
3.3.4 Uncertainties of hyper-parameters 
In practice, the industry prefers a confidence interval of the failure rate rather than just a point 
estimate. Given a pair of hyper-parameters, by either Vaurio's EB or QBW EB procedure, one can 
adopt different approaches to estimate the confidence interval.   
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First, with known 𝛼 and 𝛽 values, it is easy to utilize Monte Carlo simulation to generate large 
quantities of random variables following the specific gamma distribution. After ranking the variables, 
one can pick up the percentiles corresponding to the confidence level of interest. This method 
requires large amount of computation and is therefore time consuming if a highly precise interval is to 
be obtained.  
In contrast, one can also utilize the inverse gamma function to analytically calculate the percentiles 
of interest. It can be proved that this analytical result is consistent with the Monte Carlo simulation 
result as long as the simulation time is huge enough. Both of the two methods will be utilized in the 
numerical example later.  
However, the above confidence interval obtained is based on the presumption that the empirically 
calculated 𝛼 and 𝛽 are right the true parameters which obviously is not correct. In order to quantify 
the uncertainty of the failure rate estimation, it is reasonable to count in the uncertainties existing in 
the hyper-parameter estimation procedure.  
3.4 Estimation of zero failure events 
Sometimes, no observation is recorded during the time of the study. Then precise estimation may be 
difficult but a non-zero estimate is still desirable. Some approaches have been proposed to solve the 
problem of evaluating zero failure events.  
Hanley and Lippman-Hand (1983) presents a rule of three for estimating a confidence interval of 
the zero failure event probability at 95% confidence level. This is a simple approximation based on 
binomial distribution. When doctors are interested in the unknown probability of cancer of each 
person (𝑝), they choose a sample of 𝑛 people, among which no one suffers from cancer. At a 95% 
confidence level, the zero event probability is (1 − 𝑝)𝑛 = 0.05 3.36 
𝑛𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑝) = ln (0.05) 3.37 
According to Taylor's theorem, and the fact that natural log of 0.05 is approximately -3, Equation 
3.37 can be transformed into the following form 
𝑛(−𝑝) = −3 3.38 
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Therefore, the probability is in a 95% confidence interval from 0 to 3/𝑛. This rule of three is 
accurate when the sample size is larger than 30. This means that even no observation appears, one can 
still get an estimate of the unknown probability at the confidence level of 95%. In the assessment of 
CCF of the type of failure to start in the nuclear power plants, it can be applied when no CCF is 
recorded in the total 𝑛 demands.  
As the failure rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of failures and the operation time, the 
MLE estimate would be zero in this case which is obviously unrealistic. When it comes to the failure 
rate estimation given zero failure events, the Chi-square distribution can be used to find the 
confidence intervals from 0 to an upper bound at a confidence interval 100(1 − 𝛼).  
𝑃𝑟 �𝜆𝜆 ≤
?̂?𝜆�𝜒2;100(1−𝛼)2 �2 � = 1 − 𝛼 3.39 
?̂?𝜆 = 1
𝑛𝑇
 3.40 
Therefore the upper 100(1 − 𝛼) confidence limit for the rate is given as follows.  
𝜆𝜆100(1−𝛼) = 𝜒2;100(1−𝛼)2 2𝑛𝑇  3.41 
Since Chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom of 2 is equal to an exponential distribution 
with mean value of 2, after simplification, the upper bound limit is obtained as  
𝜆𝜆100(1−𝛼) = −𝑙𝑛(𝛼)𝑛𝑇  3.42 
where𝑛 is the number of components that are tested. So far, the problem of estimating zero event 
failure rates has been solved using a simple method as well.  
3.5 Numerical examples 
In this section, two numerical examples will be analyzed by James-Stein, Vaurio's EB and Quigley et 
al.'s EB estimators in order to investigate the similarity and diversity of them. As a contrast, the MLE 
method which is introduced at the beginning of this chapter is also included such that the superiorities 
of the statistical methods to the point estimate can be demonstrated. Based on the calculation result, 
one can conclude each method's applicability and performance on certain data. The choice of 
approach is vital for the new CCF model is proposed in Chapter 4.  
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3.5.1 Example 1 
The data (𝑁𝑖,𝑇𝑖), the number of failures in relative time of exposure of each component, are used in 
Vaurio’s paper on James-Stein estimator (1992). As given in Table 3.3, the estimates are the mean 
values of the posterior distributions or MLE, and the standard deviations (S.D.) of the estimates are 
listed as well. Vaurio's EB method yields a single prior for all the seven estimates and a set of 
parameters is generated, as 𝛼 = 0.9070 and 𝛽 = 0.7485. Similarly, QBW EB procedure produces a 
different prior for the estimates with 𝛼 = 37.8144 and 𝛽 = 62.6769. It can be seen that the QBW EB 
hyper-parameters are much larger than those of Vaurio's procedure, which can explain the reason why 
the QBW posterior is less influenced by a specific component's data.  
Table 3.3: MLE, JS, Vaurio's EB and QBW EB failure rate estimates for valves 
𝑖 𝑁𝑖 𝑇𝑖 
MLE James-Stein Vaurio's EB QBW EB 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
1 31 236.9020 0.1309 0.0235 0.1355 0.0711 0.1343 0.0238 0.2297 0.0277 
2 157 115.9440 1.3541 0.1081 1.3528 0.1014 1.3532 0.1077 1.0907 0.0781 
3 30 36.8120 0.8150 0.1488 0.8255 0.1783 0.8229 0.1480 0.6816 0.0828 
4 13 7.5970 1.7112 0.4746 1.6506 0.3734 1.6664 0.4469 0.7231 0.1014 
5 7 5.4660 1.2806 0.4840 1.2683 0.4303 1.2723 0.4525 0.6577 0.0982 
6 7 1.6890 4.1445 1.5665 3.0310 0.6652 3.2439 1.1536 0.6962 0.1040 
7 0 1.1230 0.0000 0.0000 0.5749 0.7476 0.4846 0.5089 0.5927 0.0964 
8 0 0.5520 0.0000 0.0000 0.7826 0.8723 0.6974 0.7323 0.5981 0.0973 
 
In order to show the effects of different methods on the failure rate estimation, plot the mean values 
of all the components in Figure 3.4. First, as can be seen in the figure, all the three statistical 
approaches shrink the failure rates from the MLE to an unknown overall average. This is a novel and 
valuable feature that could solve the limitation of data to some extent in the nuclear power plant 
reliability assessment by borrowing data from similar components, systems or plants. Second, the JS 
and EB estimators developed by Vaurio show similar performances due to the estimation procedures. 
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Third, QBW EB estimator is less sensitive to specific data than the other two. All the components of 
interest are considered as though they are highly identical or even the same while in fact the point 
estimates distinguish from each other. This result can be foreseen from the estimation procedure when 
the data of different components are summed up without any unequal treatments. Last but not least, 
all the three approaches can produce a positive failure rate for the event that has never happened in 
the past. This is of great importance in the field of probabilistic safety assessment of rare events. 
Zero-data event can still be evaluated by assimilating information from other sources.  
 
Figure 3.4: Failure rate estimates by different methods 
Although the estimation results of failure rates are promising, it is still necessary to compare the 
standard deviations (S.D.) of different methods to check the variability. The S.D. of the MLE is 
derived from the variance of gamma distribution. Besides, the standard deviations of the two EB 
methods' posteriors are also plotted in the same figure below. It is clear that all the James-Stein, 
Vaurio's empirical Bayes and QBW EB methods are more accurate by achieving lower S.D. of the 
estimate. Besides, the MLE method gives zero estimates and standard deviations for the zero failure 
events (last two components). This is obviously incorrect as the observation times are not long 
enough to record failures.  
Moreover, the uncertainties in the calculation of 𝛼 and 𝛽  are not taken into consideration. The 
authors take the estimates of 𝛼 and 𝛽 based on the data as the true ones as granted. But in fact, the 
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estimated parameters are not completely accurate. Last but not least, QBW EB procedure seems 
rather advanced because of the much lower standard deviations of its posterior distributions. This 
stems from the unique estimation procedure and relatively large 𝛼 and 𝛽. One should also keep in 
mind that QBW EB procedure is more suitable for identical data.  
 
Figure 3.5: Standard deviations of the estimates by different methods 
In reality, the probability density functions (PDFs) may be more welcomed by the industry 
compared to the point estimate. With the help of the PDF, one can visually be aware of the statistical 
characteristics of the estimate such as the scale parameter, shape parameter as well as the variability. 
The James-Stein estimator is not included as it is a Frequentist approach rather than a Bayesian 
method. Therefore, in this example, the posterior distributions of each component generated by 
different approaches will be plotted. Prior distributions are not included as they are the same for all 
the components. One should be aware that the posterior is generally narrower than prior meaning that 
the uncertainty is reduced after the Bayesian update.  
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Figure 3.6: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 1 
 
Figure 3.7: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 2 
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Figure 3.8: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 3 
 
Figure 3.9: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 4 
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Figure 3.10: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 5 
 
Figure 3.11: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 6 
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Figure 3.12: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 7 
 
Figure 3.13: Posterior distributions of the failure rate of component 8 
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Some conclusions can be drawn from the above 8 PDF figures. First of all, according to the figures, 
Vaurio's EB estimator is more sensitive to specific component's data than QBW EB procedure. The 
posteriors in Figure 3.6 to Figure 3.10 almost coincide with the MLE results because the hyper-
parameters are far smaller than a certain component's data. In contrast, QBW EB procedure is always 
stable in a narrow range no matter if the data are enough or not. A set of much larger hyper-
parameters are generated from the estimation procedure and hence leads to the insensitivity to the 
individual data. Moreover, if there is indication showing that the components under study are highly 
identical, then QBW EB procedure may be a good choice to evaluate their failure rates. Last, 
according to the PDFs in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13, zero-failure events can be estimated by the 
means of EB. The EB posterior distributions still exist by assimilating information from other 
components, which shows the advantage of the means of EB. 
If one is interested in the 90% confidence interval of the fourth component, for instance, the 
methods given in Section 3.2.4 are available to be used. By calculating the 5% and 95% percentiles, 
the confidence interval can be regarded as from the lower one to the higher. The results are listed in 
the table below. It is obvious that the two methods yield consistent result of confidence interval.  
Table 3.4: The 90% confidence intervals of component 4 using Monte Carlo simulation and inverse 
gamma function 
 5% 95% 
Monte Carlo simulation 104 0.6079      times 1.5091 
Monte Carlo simulation 105 0.6117      times 1.4916 
Monte Carlo simulation 106 0.6107      times 1.4958 
Inverse gamma function 0.6104     1.4951 
 
3.5.2 Example 2 
Example 2 involves a small sample of data used by Vaurio (1986). The data of the four components 
are recorded in pairs (𝑁𝑖,𝑇𝑖). The mean and variance/standard deviation of all the four estimators are 
listed in the table below.  
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Table 3.5: MLE, JS, Vaurio EB and Quigley EB results of Example 2 
𝑖 𝑁𝑖 𝑇𝑖 
MLE James-Stein Vaurio's EB QBW EB 
Mean S.D. Mean Var Mean S.D. Mean Var 
1 4 1 4 2 0.0600 -31.3766 3.6892 1.3096 48.3333 2497.2222 
2 3 1 3 1.7321 3.1541 -31.3766 3.2243 1.2243 -3.3333 -172.2222 
3 2 1 2 1.4142 6.2482 -31.3766 2.7594 1.1326 -55.0000 -2841.6667 
4 1 0.2 5 5 2.6882 -2.7773 3.6532 1.6443 2.6446 -3.3877 
 
In the example, the JS estimator produces a negative overall variance that is certainly wrong. 
Hence it can be concluded that for small sample data, the JS estimator proposed by Vaurio may not be 
applicable. In addition, QBW EB procedure is not applicable either because of 𝑊 < 𝑈2 resulting in 
negative hyper-parameters and variances. Therefore, the only one in the three statistical approaches is 
Vaurio's EB estimator. According to the plot of MLE and posterior mean values of Vaurio’s EB 
procedure in Figure 3.14, the shrinkage effect is still obvious for the small sample unlike the 
unrealistic results of the JS or QBW EB procedure estimators. The hyper-parameters are: 𝛼 = 3.9359 
and 𝛽 = 1.1511. 
 
Figure 3.14: Failure rate estimates by the MLE and Vaurio's EB procedure 
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Figure 3.15: Standard deviations of the estimates by different methods 
Second, as shown above, plot the standard deviations of the estimates of MLE and Vaurio's EB 
method. It can be seen that EB method generates much smaller standard deviations meaning that its 
failure rates are more accurate than the MLE.  
In the next, the prior and posterior distributions of Vaurio's EB are plotted in the four figures below. 
For all the four components, the posterior distributions are higher and narrower than the priors as 
indicated below. The uncertainties of the estimates are therefore reduced by the means of Bayesian. 
Besides, the fourth component has a short operation time meaning large uncertainty and unreliability 
of the MLE estimate. With the help of Vaurio's EB method, one can still generat a posterior 
distribution for the failure rate regardless the limitation of the data of this specific component.  
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Figure 3.16: Prior and posterior distributions of component 1 
 
Figure 3.17: Prior and posterior distributions of component 2 
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Figure 3.18: Prior and posterior distributions of component 3 
 
Figure 3.19: Prior and posterior distributions of component 4 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented three statistical approaches theoretically and numerically other than the 
MLE. Generally, all the three methods are more reliable than the MLE by assimilating data 
information from other resources. The MLE is subject to large uncertainty especially when the data 
are sparse and the observation time if limited.  
The JS method proposed by Vaurio is taking the view point of Frequentist statistics and dominates 
the point estimate all the time. However, according to the second example, inapplicability of the 
method arises when the component group is small which results from the algorithm. Also, this 
Frequentist approach only produces an estimate but the industry is more likely to expect a confidence 
interval or even a whole distribution for the objective of the estimation.  
QBW EB estimator is able to provide a distribution based on the Bayesian statistics. It is especially 
suitable for identical components in a group because of the strong pooling of the data. Whereas, it 
cannot be used for small samples either because of the negative hyper-parameter 𝛼 or 𝛽 or both. The 
improvement of the algorithm needs further research.  
In the end, Vaurio's EB estimator is regarded as an optimal one for the failure rate estimation in the 
assessment of rare events, for instance the common cause failure. Its broad applicability, remarkable 
shrinkage effect and capability of describing the estimate with distributions are quite superior to the 
others, not to mention the widely used point estimate. In the next chapter, a distinguished model for 
assessing the CCF will be proposed. Vaurio's EB will be utilized in the estimation procedure.  
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Chapter 4 
Multivariate Poisson Model 
4.1 Introduction of the multivariate Poisson (MVP) model 
As discussed in the chapter before, some of the current CCF models are somehow dependent on 
strong assumptions such as the BF and BFR models. These assumptions are hardly following the 
unknown nature of the failure which makes the models less trustworthy. In contrast, other models like 
the MGL and BP models are solely based on the recorded numbers of failures in order to estimate the 
specific failure rates of interest. However, the sparseness of the data in practice reduces the accuracy 
associated with the point estimate estimated directly from the data. Given a limited database of a 
certain CCCG, it is of importance to propose a new method which does not rely on robust 
assumptions, respects practical data, and achieves high accuracy as well.  
Karlis (2002) presents a multivariate Poisson model that can be extended to the CCF assessment 
and solves the above remaining problems nicely. Consider a 3-component common cause component 
group again. The failure scenarios of the CCCG can be decomposed into the following seven 
scenarios:{1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 23, 123}where the first three refer to the individual-component failures, and 
the remaining four elements to the CCFs. Accordingly, the problem has been decomposed into the 
estimation of a group of seven failure rates[𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3, 𝜆𝜆12, 𝜆𝜆13, 𝜆𝜆23, 𝜆𝜆123 ].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Multivariate Poisson model of CCCG of size 3 
Due to the facts that the occurrence of failure events (both independent and dependent) can be 
modeled by a Poisson process, and that the superposition of Poisson processes is still a Poisson 
process, the total failure events involving a specific component, i.e., component 1, can be expressed 
as in Equation 4.5.  
  
𝜆𝜆1 
         
            𝜆𝜆13  
              
      𝜆𝜆3 
          𝜆𝜆12    
                  𝜆𝜆123   
𝜆𝜆2                𝜆𝜆23  
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𝑋1~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝜆1) 4.1 
𝑋12~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝜆12) 4.2 
𝑋13~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝜆13) 4.3 
𝑋123~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝜆123) 4.4 
𝑋1 + 𝑋12 + 𝑋13 + 𝑋123~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆123) 4.5 
Therefore, all the failures that may occur in practice are able to be characterized by the mutually 
exclusive elements in the MVP model. This complete decomposition of the failure events eliminates 
the confusion in the conventional models, e.g., the alpha factor model, that whether a multi-
component failure is supposed to be a single common cause event or a combination of multiple events 
involving fewer components. 
4.2 Relation between the MVP and traditional parametric CCF models 
Some parametric CCF models are available at present such as the beta factor model, multiple Greek 
letter model, alpha factor model, basic parameter model, as well as binomial failure rate model. The 
first difference is that the MVP model does not strongly rely on assumptions as those traditional ones, 
e.g., beta factor model and binomial failure rate model, do. It solely depends on the practical data 
collected during the operation time. Second, the MVP distinguishes all the possible failures and treats 
them as unique components. On the contrary, all the other conventional parametric models make a 
symmetry assumption, which supposes that failure events involving the same number of components 
are the same. For instance, in a three-component group, the independent failure rates of component 1, 
2, 3 are equal and calculated as the total independent failure rate divided by three. So is the double-
component failure rates treated. In other words, failure scenarios with the same multiplicity are 
pooled to be the same and diversity is ignored completely. In fact, however, components in the same 
CCCG are supposed to be diverse as a defense in order to prevent CCF. Third, there is confusion in 
the traditional parametric CCF models about whether a multi-component failure event is caused by a 
single CCF. By contrast, the MVP model eliminates the confusion by the exclusive failure rates 
defined in the framework.  
  59 
Apart from the above differences, some connections between the MVP and traditional models are 
readily established. For instance, given the seven failure rates of the mutually exclusive events, one 
can calculate the total failure rate of a specific component, i.e., Component 1, as  
𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙−1 = 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆123 4.6 
Similarly, if one is interested to know the failure rate of the k-out-of-n system, it can be also easily 
calculated from the failure rates of the MVP model. For a 2-out-of-3 configuration, it is  
𝛬2𝑜𝑜3 = 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆23 + 𝜆𝜆123 4.7 
Note that the possibilities of multiple failure events happening simultaneously have already been 
screened out according to the assumption of MVP model. 
Furthermore, common cause factors such as the alpha factors, beta factor and multiple Greek letters 
defined by various models are the ones that are used to represent the plant's characteristics in practice. 
These can also be obtained based on their definition once the failure rates of the MVP are given. For 
instance, the alpha factors are calculated as 
𝛼1/3 = 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3 + 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆23 + 𝜆𝜆123  4.8 
𝛼2/3 = 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆23𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3 + 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆23 + 𝜆𝜆123  4.9 
𝛼3/3 = 𝜆𝜆123 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2 + 𝜆𝜆3 + 𝜆𝜆12 + 𝜆𝜆13 + 𝜆𝜆23 + 𝜆𝜆123  4.10 
4.3 Comparison of the estimation procedures 
First, apply Vaurio's EB and QBW EB procedure to the group of seven failure rates respectively. 
Each method generates one prior which means that the seven rates are realizations of a single 
distribution. However, it is recommended that the data be grouped into some subgroups that are more 
homogeneous. Then apply EB method to each sub-group. For example, when predicting many 
students’ grades, it is better to group them into three subgroups (good, medium, bad) based on their 
past grades in history and apply the EB method to each of the subgroups respectively (Shen, 2006). 
Therefore, Vaurio's procedure combined with grouping method (denoted as G-V-EB) is to be adopted 
as the third potential estimation approach. When applying G-V-EB method, the first three rates are 
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put in one sub-group while the remaining four are grouped into another according to their magnitudes 
and understandings of their natures: {(𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3), (𝜆𝜆12, 𝜆𝜆13, 𝜆𝜆23, 𝜆𝜆123 )} .In this way, two prior 
distributions will be produced, one is for independent failures and the other is for CCFs, which seems 
more reasonable. Grouping is not adopted in QBW procedure because of its narrow applicability to 
sub-groups of small sizes. Included for the comparison is also the maximum likelihood estimate 
(MLE), which is introduced in Chapter 3.  
Before recommending a procedure for estimating the hyper-parameters of the proposed MVP 
model, it is necessary to compare the performance of the four estimation procedures reviewed above. 
Monte Carlo simulation is conducted for the comparison. The exact values of seven failure rates𝜆𝜆𝑖 are 
listed in Table 4.1below. The operation time of the system is assumed to be 5000 months in the 
simulation. Failure data are randomly generated from the Poisson processes with the corresponding 
failure rates. By comparing the estimates of various methods with the true values, it is ready to 
conclude the best procedure. To achieve a reliable conclusion, a total number of 10,000 simulations 
are run. 
Now that the required information for Monte Carlo simulation has been determined previously, the 
next step is to set some indicators to represent the effectiveness of various estimation methods namely 
the MLE, QBW-EB, V-EB and G-V-EB. Three indicators are adopted for the comparison. 
4.3.1 Squared error (SE) of a specific failure rate 
The first one is the squared error (SE) of a specific failure rate 𝜆𝜆𝑖 obtained from a certain method. For 
instance, four different estimates of 𝜆𝜆1 are generated whose distances to the true value 0.011 are 
either positive or negative and certainly not the same. The squared error is therefore utilized to 
represent the accuracy of the estimation.  
𝑆𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = �?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2 4.11 
Any estimation method of the four can be seen as superior provided that its SE of 𝜆𝜆1 is smaller than 
the others'. However, due to the fact that the generation of the failure data is subject to large 
uncertainty, especially when the operation time is not long enough, one time simulation is hence 
obviously insufficient to draw a conclusion. As a result, 104
Table 4.1
 simulations are run and the percentages 
of the simulations to yield the smallest SE for 𝜆𝜆1by the four approaches are calculated as shown in the 
first row of . All the four percentages in the same row sum up to one. By extending the 
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calculation of the squared error of 𝜆𝜆1 to all the failure rates 𝜆𝜆𝑖, one can conclude that G-V-EB is much 
more accurate for the estimation of a specific rate than the other three approaches in most cases. The 
average errors of the seven failure rates yielded by G-V-EB are 9.3, 9.1, 10.5, 25.6, 26.1, 27.9, 31 
percentages of the exact values respectively. This results from the uncertainty in the generation of 
Poisson failure data. If the operation time is longer, the error will become smaller.  
Table 4.1: Calculation of the percentage of the smallest SE by each method 
i 𝜆𝜆𝑖 Percentage of the smallest SE (%) 
 (/month) MLE QWB-EB V-EB G-V-EB 
1 0.011 33.30 5.11 5.99 55.60 
2 0.01 14.08 3.93 20.73 61.26 
3 0.009 10.27 1.83 37.17 50.73 
12 0.0011 3.52 14.01 29.72 52.75 
13 0.001 20.14 0.39 35.94 43.53 
23 0.0009 11.45 10.59 23.24 54.72 
123 0.0008 30.28 1.21 29.66 38.85 
 
4.3.2 Sum of squared errors (SSE) of the whole set of failure rates 
Although G-V-EB is more accurate than the other three approaches, the superiority over the MLE for 
some of the failure rates is not quite convincing. That is because the EB method aims to improve the 
overall accuracy of all estimates rather than a certain one. Therefore, secondly, it is also essential to 
examine the overall precision of the set of seven failure rates, which can be measured by a sum of 
squared errors (SSE).  
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = ��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2123
𝑖=1
where  𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 23, 123} 4.12 
Similar to the above, a proportion of each estimation approach is to be calculated. For a random 
simulation, all the squared errors of different failure rates 𝜆𝜆𝑖  computed by a certain method, e.g., 
MLE, are added up, so are the ones obtained from the other three methods. By comparing the 
magnitudes of the SSEs for one simulation, one can come up with a more accurate method for 
estimating the whole set of failure rates. Unavoidably, however, uncertainty associated with a single 
simulation is likely to interfere with the conclusion. Large sample is required as well and the 
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percentage of each method that yields the smallest SSE is to be calculated, in order to get a more 
dependable result of the overall precision. The calculation results have been listed in Table 2 below. It 
can be seen that the proposed G-V-EB is remarkably superior to the others for estimating all the set of 
rates.  
Table 4.2: Calculation of the smallest SSE by each method 
Method MLE QBW-EB V-EB G-V-EB 
Percentage (%) 5.66 1.31 12.37 80.66 
 
4.3.3 Variations of the estimates by different methods 
While numerical calculation has proved that the proposed Vaurio's EB combined with grouping 
method (G-V-EB) to be obviously the best among the alternatives, one may be interested in the 
variation of the estimates as well. In the next, thirdly, illustration of the variations of the above four 
estimation approaches is considered as well. A visual illustration is to plot their PDFs for each failure 
rate of the MVP model. The true failure rates and operation time remain the same as previously.  
A random simulation is run with the exposure time of 5000 and the results are plotted in the figures 
below. The three different lines represent the posterior distributions of the three EB approaches. 
Moreover, to show the accuracy of the PDFs, the true value of each failure rate is marked by the 
vertical solid line in each figure.  
First of all, the elements in the same group or sub-group interact with each other. Although it is 
hard to guarantee that all the posteriors are closer to the true values of the failure rates (vertical line), 
the effectiveness of EB measures is still visible in most cases. Besides, due to the strategy of putting 
the elements of similar natures or magnitudes into the same sub-group, the G-V-EB is generally more 
accurate than the other two, resulting in narrower distributions and the closer centers to the true 
values and.  
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Figure 4.2: PDFs of λ1
 
 generated by different methods 
Figure 4.3: PDFs of λ2 generated by different methods 
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Figure 4.4: PDFs of λ3
 
 generated by different methods 
Figure 4.5: PDFs of λ12 generated by different methods 
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Figure 4.6: PDFs of λ13
 
 generated by different methods 
Figure 4.7: PDFs of λ23 generated by different methods 
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Figure 4.8: PDFs of λ123
Apart from the visual illustration of the variation, one can also utilize the variance/standard 
deviation of the posterior distribution to measure it. The variance is easy to calculate by (𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)/(𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)2. Numerical values are not given here as one time simulation is subject to large uncertainty. 
But it can be assured that G-V-EB yields the smallest variance/standard deviation in most of the times.  
 generated by different methods 
Due to the higher accuracies in the estimation of one rate or the whole set of rates proved by 
statistics, as well as the lower variability illustrated by the density functions, the Grouped Vaurio's EB 
(G-V-EB) is considered optimal to be adopted in the MVP model.  
The MVP model proposed at the beginning of this section contains a lot of parameters to be 
estimated.  For a CCCG of size 𝑛, the number of failure rates is 2𝑛 – 1.  For a three-component group, 
there are seven failure rates to be estimated. According to NUREG/CR-5497, the occurrence rate of 
independent failure is significantly higher than that of CCF while the CCFs do not obviously 
distinguish from each other. As a result, one can simply divide all the possible failures into two 
groups: one for the independent failures and the other for all the CCFs.  From practical point of view, 
it is also reasonable to separate independent and common cause failures because of their distinct 
mechanisms, and two prior distributions are produced for both sub-groups.  
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Based on the discussion above, the MVP model transforms the quantification of CCF into the 
estimation of a number of mutually exclusive failure rates using the G-V-EB procedure. The 
outcomes are a set of posterior mean values and variances, if necessary, of the mutually exclusive 
failure rates. One can therefore obtain the rate of any possible failure event, such as the total failure 
rate of a specific component, and k-out-of-n system failure rate. Moreover, the parameters of the 
conventional parametric CCF models such as the alpha factors can be calculated based on these 
estimated failure rates as well. In the next section, the proposed MVP model will be compared to 
traditional parametric CCF models.  
4.4 Comparison of the MVP and traditional CCF models 
After choosing the appropriate estimation approach, the MVP model is necessarily to be compared to 
the traditional parametric models, for instance the MGL, AF, BFR models as presented in Chapter 2. 
Consider again the 3-component system utilized in the simulation above. Both independent and 
common cause failures are generated from the simulation procedure in the operation time of 5000.  
As one of the earliest and simplest models, the beta factor (BF) model is not applicable here 
because the 2-component failure event always exists in the simulated database. This fact is against the 
assumption of the BF model. As a result, its extension the multiple-Greek letter (MGL) model is 
taken as a comparison with the MVP model. Besides, alpha factor model is one whose parameters are 
solely dependent on the data. It respects the practical observations a lot without extra robust 
assumptions while large uncertainties are unavoidable due to the rarity of the CCF data in practice. 
This kind of performance deserves to be a control group for the MVP model. Moreover, the binomial 
failure rate (BFR) is rather different from the others because of its unique assumptions about lethal 
and non-lethal shocks. The performance of BFR model is to be examined in the simulation as well. 
Furthermore, the true values of the estimates are able to be obtained as a benchmark since the failure 
rates have been presumed for the simulation already. 
4.4.1 Calculation of the reliability of system 
Two factors will be calculated within the Monte Carlo simulation. One is the reliability of k-out-of-
3(𝑘 = 1, 2, 3) system in an exposure time of 200 units. The calculations formulas have been derived 
in Chapter 1. It is of importance to check the overall performance of the proposed MVP model when 
applied in practice. All the three conventional parametric models and the true values mentioned above 
will be calculated likewise. The table below shows the results of one trial in the simulation. One can 
  68 
easily conclude that the MVP model is more accurate than the traditional ones. In fact, after large 
quantities of simulation, this superiority retains.  
Table 4.3: Reliability of a k-out-of-3 system using different models 
Multiplicity 𝑘 1 2 3 
True 3.05E-01 2.37E-02 1.16E-03 
MGL 3.28E-01 2.39E-02 1.26E-03 
AF 3.28E-01 2.39E-02 1.26E-03 
BFR 2.59E-01 2.65E-02 1.30E-03 
MVP 3.16E-01 2.39E-02 1.23E-03 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Reliability of a k-out-of-3 system using different models 
In order to visually illustrate the difference, the failure rates are plotted in the same figure. The true 
reliability of the system is easy to obtain using the assumed values of the simulation as listed in Table 
4.1. Since both MGL and AF models have their factors defined in terms of BP model parameters 
which depend merely on the data, their performances are the same in the example. As can be seen in 
the figure, the MVP model is much more accurate than the traditional models as the evaluated failure 
rates are closer to the true ones. Based on this phenomenon, one can conclude that in most cases, the 
newly developed MVP model is superior to those ones that are currently widely adopted.  
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4.4.2 Calculation of the CCF factors 
Apart from the failure rate of a system, another aspect to be evaluated is accuracy of the traditional 
CCF factors estimation based on outcomes the MVP model. Since the alpha factor model is one of the 
most commonly used, take the alpha factors as example. Again, the true values of alpha factors are 
included for comparison. Details are included in the table below. To visually illustrate the difference, 
plot the alpha factors in the figure below and apply the logarithmic coordinates to y axis.  
Table 4.4: Alpha factors using different models 
 
𝛼1/3 𝛼2/3 𝛼3/3 
True 8.88E-01 8.88E-02 2.37E-02 
Alpha 8.68E-01 1.15E-01 1.65E-02 
MVP 8.67E-01 1.09E-01 2.39E-02 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Alpha factor calculation using the AF and MVP models 
According to the simulation results, it is apparent that in most cases the MVP model yields closer 
estimates of alpha factors than the alpha factor model does. The reason lies in the unique property of 
EB approach as discussed in Chapter 3. This characteristic solves the problem that the AF model is 
subject to large uncertainties in the parameter estimation when the data are sparse. Since all the CCF 
factors are proportions of different types of failure events (except the BFR parameters) and also able 
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to be obtained using failure rates instead of numbers of failures, one can conclude that the estimation 
of these factors is supposed to be more accurate with less uncertainty as long as the MVP model is 
adopted.  
4.5 Summary 
This chapter proposes a multivariate Poisson (MVP) model for CCF assessment. It also recommends 
the Vaurio's EB procedure combined with a grouping strategy (called the G-V-EB procedure) for the 
failure rate estimation. Compared to the conventional parametric CCF models, the MVP model is 
believed to be able to assimilate information from other components in the same sub-group, achieve 
higher accuracy, and get rid of strong assumptions. The main characteristic of the method is that 
every type of failure scenario is considered unique, which requires the failure data recorded in detail. 
In other words, when a failure event appears, the operation engineer should keep a record of which 
specific components are involved in the event. This newly proposed model is rather efficient for 
plant-specific estimation because all the data are observed within the target plant and no outer data 
source is introduced. 
Two tests have been conducted to examine the performance of MVP model in the evaluation of the 
whole system and the estimation of traditional CCF factors. Obvious evidence has indicated that the 
MVP model is more reliable than the traditional ones in most cases because the calculation results 
using MVP model's outcomes are closer to the real values assumed. 
However, there remain some drawbacks for the newly proposed MVP model. Since the practical 
operation team sometimes does not record the specific component combination of the CCFs, the 
requirement of data is hard to be satisfied. The failure events are simply included in the daily log with 
their times, root causes as well as component statuses. Sometimes the failures from source plants of 
the same size are merged together. Moreover, due to the sparseness of the CCF, the number of 
common cause failures is probably zero unless the operation time is long enough whereas the 
component may not be able to function if the time is too long. Once a component is replaced by a new 
one, the previous recorded failures of it are useless owing to the unique component assumption. This 
contradict will always remain with the MVP model.  
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Chapter 5 
Data Mapping Combined with Empirical Bayes 
5.1 Introduction of the combination of data mapping and empirical Bayes 
Chapter 4 has introduced a multivariate Poisson (MVP) model for CCF modeling. It is an effective 
approach to implement plant-specific assessment, which means the data used are collected from the 
target plant of interest and the evaluation result is generated for specific components in the system. In 
other words, the MVP model is not able to make use of the data of source plants and reliable 
evaluation depends on large database of its own in a long operation time.  
In contrast, there is a method called data mapping to assimilate information from source plants such 
that the limitation of data can be solved. Data mapping has been introduced in Chapter 2, as well as 
the developments by Vaurio et al. The traditional data mapping procedure generates a group of failure 
rates from the source plants of various sizes to the target plant. But there are no further instructions 
about how to merge these mapping results from different sizes. Kvam and Miller (2002) proposed a 
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) for the mapping results which are assumed to be the failure data 
recorded from the target plant in different time intervals. This treatment, however, is rather robust not 
only based on the numerical magnitudes but also from the practical point of view. Hence, there need 
to be a new approach to solve the existing problems. 
In this chapter, data mapping will be combined with empirical Bayes approach in order to make 
better use of the outcomes of the traditional data mapping and to result in a more reasonable 
conclusion. First of all, the failure data are processed following the data mapping formulas provided 
by Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 in Chapter 2. Detailed derivations are available in NUREG/CR-4780 
Volume 1 and 2. At this stage, the data of source plants are mapped in to the size of the target plant as 
though various plants (including the target one) of the same size are available, i.e., 𝑁𝑖_𝑘 and 𝑇𝑖 are 
already known for every multiplicity 𝑘 in system 𝑖. Second, since these systems are not believed to be 
identical, the HPP assumption is quite arguable. As a result, for each multiplicity 𝑘, the number of 
failures 𝑁𝑘 of the target system is able to be re-evaluated by the means of EB, partially assimilating 
from other systems and respecting its own data at the same time. After the implementation of EB 
approach, either the failure rates or the numbers of the target system are believed to be more reliable 
compared to the raw data alone. Third, with the data processed by data mapping and EB algorithm 
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one can easily estimate the failure rate of each multiplicity 𝑘 and conventional CCF factors such as 
the alpha factors.  
Note the component type is MOV and failure mode is failure to open (FO) in this chapter. There 
are various component statuses, namely working (W), complete failure (C), degraded (D) and 
incipient (I). It is common to utilize the impact vector to evaluate the possibility of every type of 
failure event in practice. However, for the ease of calculation, the thesis takes the statuses C, D and I 
as failure. Illustration of the combination of the data mapping and EB is the main purpose of the 
chapter. For higher accuracy, one can replace the data used below by impact vectors easily.  
5.2 Case study 1 using a small motor-operated valve dataset 
In this Section, we have used a sample of MOV data that represent typical operating experience in a 
nuclear plant, purely for illustration purposes. In nuclear power plants there are various sizes for the 
systems of MOVs, i.e., 2, 4, 8 and 16. The number of systems for each size varies. A simple 
assumption has been made that systems of the same size are identical and the failure data can be seen 
as collected from a typical system in different time intervals. Hence, it is reasonable to sum up the 
operation times and numbers of failures respectively for the typical system of a specific size. The 
operation time for all the plants are 18 years and the unit of time in the case study is month.  
Let the 4-MOV system be the target system. The failure data of all the other three sizes have to be 
mapped upward/downward to 𝑛 = 4. First, mapping down from 𝑛 = 8 or 16 can be implemented by 
following Equation 2.25 or formulas listed in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2. The mapping down procedure is 
straightforward. Second, as to mapping up from 𝑛 = 2 to 4, formulas are available in Table 2.4. What 
should be notable is that there is no further indication of whether the failures are caused by lethal or 
non-lethal shock. Some simplifying assumptions are made as follows: a) all the single-component 
failures are independent and b) all the multi-component failures are caused by non-lethal shocks. 
Therefore, an extra parameter 𝜌  has to be introduced and also assumed as 0.2 according to 
NUREG/CR-4780. Following the mapping formulas provided above, one can come up with the 
results in the table below. The data of each different size are transformed to be of the target system 
size 4.  
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Table 5.1: Data after mapping process 
System size Number of failures 
𝑛 1/𝑛 2/𝑛 3/𝑛 4/𝑛 
2 36 0.6400 0.3200 0.0400 
4 18 2 10 1 
8 3.5714 0.2143 0 0 
16 4.0456 0.4209 0.1099 0.0082 
sum 61.6170 3.2752 10.4299 1.0482 
 
Based on the data after mapping, there are two options about how to make use of them such as 
calculating CCF parameters. Take alpha factors as an example. Option 1: Assume a homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP) for the whole database which means that the mapped data from source plants 
are collected from a typical system of size 4in four different operation times. In order to obtain the 
alpha factors, the numbers of all the 𝑘/𝑛 failures are to be summed up respectively (as has been done 
in the table above), and then calculate the proportions of them. Results are listed in the table below. 
One can refer to Equation 2.15 to 2.17.  
Table 5.2: Alpha factors of 4-MOV system based on the assumption of HPP 
Multiplicity 𝑘 1 2 3 4 
𝑁𝑘/𝑛 61.6170 3.2752 10.4299 1.0482 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 0.8068 0.0429 0.1366 0.0137 
 
Option 2: Since the data of each size differ greatly from each other, it is not convincing to make an 
HPP assumption upon the whole database, considering both the numerical variations and the practical 
situations such as system size, environment, and maintenance. It is hence necessary to propose an 
approach which is capable of assimilating information from other sources and respecting the target 
system's data as well. Fortunately, empirical Bayes is the one that can meet the requirement.  
In order to estimate alpha factors of the 4-MOV system accurately, precise evaluations of the 
numbers of failures for all multiplicities are necessary. Consider 1/4 failures of all the four sizes as an 
example. The number of failures after data mapping and the corresponding time are listed in the 
second and third columns of the table below, which are required by the empirical Bayes algorithm. As 
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QBW EB method has some limitations of inapplicability for small sample and strong pooling effect, 
the EB procedure proposed by Vaurio (1987) is utilized for the calculation here. The detailed 
calculation procedure has been listed in the table below. The outcome is the posterior mean value of 
the failure rate 𝛬1/4 of the target system after Bayesian update which has been included in the fourth 
column. 
Table 5.3: Calculation of the 1/4 failure rate by the means of EB 
System size 𝑛 𝑁1/4 𝑇𝑛 𝛬1/4 
2 36 10584 3.44E-03 
4 18 3672 4.49E-03 
8 3.5714 1728 2.91E-03 
16 4.0456 1080 3.71E-03 
 
After applying the EB algorithm to all the multiplicities 𝑘/𝑛  respectively, the failure rates  
𝛬𝑘/𝑛 of the target system (of size 4) are believed to be closer to the inherent unknown rates. The 
results are shown in Table 5.4 below.  
Table 5.4: Failure rates of all the multiplicities in different systems using EB approach 
Size Λk/n n 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 
2 3.44E-03 1.13E-04 5.76E-05 3.23E-05 
4 4.49E-03 4.58E-04 2.55E-03 2.26E-04 
8 2.91E-03 2.48E-04 1.48E-04 9.14E-05 
16 3.71E-03 3.50E-04 2.89E-04 1.11E-04 
 
The alpha factors can be easily calculated by following Equation 2.17. All the calculation results 
are given in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: Alpha factors of 4-MOV system using the EB approach 
Multiplicity 𝑘 1 2 3 4 
𝛬𝑘/𝑛 4.49E-03 4.58E-04 2.55E-03 2.26E-04 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 0.5813 0.0594 0.3300 0.0293 
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The two options' results have been plotted in the figure below for comparison. An apparent 
difference has been shown visually in Figure 5.1 below. First, the CCF data show a higher possibility 
of 3/4 failure event than the other CCF, i.e., 2/4 and 4/4. Second, the HPP assumption yields a larger 
proportion of independent failures. This phenomenon may probably stem from the fact that 
independent failure is more likely to occur and the summation of independent failures takes a higher 
percentage than the data of any specific plant itself.  
 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of alpha factors calculated by different approaches using database 1 
5.3 Case study 2 using a large MOV dataset 
As the same as section 5.2 above, the calculation of alpha factors will be repeated by constructing a 
larger dataset. The idea is to understand how different method works when sufficiently large data are 
available. The system sizes contain 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, and 24. Actual data are confidential.  
By the means of data mapping, the failure data of all the different sizes can be transformed to be 
size 4, as if they are recorded in a typical 4-MOV system. Details have been given in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6: Data after mapping process: case study 2 
System size Number of failures 
𝑛 1/𝑛 2/𝑛 3/𝑛 4/𝑛 
2 154 5.1200 2.5600 0.3200 
4 209 10 12 11 
8 170.3571 2.3571 0.1429 0.0000 
12 10.6909 1.0182 0.1939 0.0061 
16 5.1670 0.5995 0.1170 0.0082 
24 3.2464 0.0435 0.0000 0.0000 
sum 552.4615 19.1383 15.0138 11.3343 
 
Based on these data after mapping, one can easily apply the HPP assumption and EB algorithm 
again. By assuming HPP process, numbers of failures of all the four multiplicities are summed up 
respectively. Alpha factors are hence obtained as the same way in previous example. 
Table 5.7: Alpha factors of 4-MOV system based on the assumption of HPP  
Multiplicity 𝑘 1 2 3 4 
𝑁𝑘/𝑛 552.4615 19.1383 15.0138 11.3343 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 0.9239 0.0320 0.0251 0.0190 
 
Similar to the above, apply EB approach to each multiplicity. One can gain the corresponding 
failure rate as follows. 
Table 5.8: Failure rates of all the multiplicities in different systems using EB approach 
Size 𝛬𝑘/𝑛 
𝑛 1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 
2 1.74E-03 5.99E-05 3.24E-05 6.91E-06 
4 2.92E-03 1.41E-04 1.58E-04 1.44E-04 
8 1.91E-03 2.91E-05 7.42E-06 3.55E-06 
12 1.42E-02 7.40E-04 9.03E-05 4.62E-05 
16 3.18E-03 3.09E-04 7.22E-05 4.06E-05 
24 6.85E-03 2.08E-04 6.94E-05 4.67E-05 
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Following Equation 2.17, it is easy to obtain the alpha factors with the outcomes of EB approach 
for the target system of size 4.  
Table 5.9: Alpha factors of 4-MOV system applying EB approach 
Multiplicity 𝑘 1 2 3 4 
𝛬𝑘/𝑛 2.92E-03 1.41E-04 1.58E-04 1.44E-04 
𝛼𝑘/𝑛 0.8682 0.0420 0.0470 0.0429 
 
In the next, plot the results of alpha factors using CCF data in the figure below. It can be concluded 
that the percentage taken by independent failure calculated by HPP method is still larger than that of 
EB method. But since the operation time is long enough for the size of 4, the difference is not as 
obvious as shown in Figure 5.1 above.  
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison of alpha factors calculated by different approaches using database 2. 
5.4 Summary 
This Chapter presents two illustrative case studies in which various methods of CCF analysis are 
compared. It can be seen that the results using different data sets differ from each other. This may 
results from the different configurations, maintenances, environments and so on. Besides, the EB 
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algorithm yields higher CCF probability than HPP. The phenomenon may stem from the fact that 
independent failure is more likely to occur than CCF. Therefore, for the HPP method, summing up 
the independent failures (i.e., 1/4) among all sizes may probably lead to a higher proportion of 
independent failure than the data of a certain system its own, unless the operation time is long 
enough. Furthermore, it is not easy to judge which way is superior because the real value is never 
known in practice. However, if one is interested in plant-specific evaluation, the EB approach is 
supposed to be better.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Challenges 
6.1 Conclusion 
First, this thesis has reviewed the current CCF modeling approaches, highlighting some of the 
disadvantages of existing methodologies such as the large uncertainty, reliance on overly simplified 
assumptions, and requirement for plentiful failure data in nuclear power plants. Second, a multivariate 
Poisson model incorporated with the empirical Bayes technique has been proposed for the CCF 
assessment. Third, Vaurio's EB method has been combined with traditional data mapping approach in 
order to assimilate information from source plants due to the limitation of failure data of the target 
plants. A comprehensive case study has been presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 3 and 4 are the main 
body of a paper accepted by 11th
Since the Vaurio's empirical Bayes method has some distinctive properties such as broad 
applicability, higher accuracy and capability of quantifying the estimation uncertainty with posterior 
distributions, it has been adopted for estimating the failure rates in the framework of MVP model. 
According to the large sample of Monte Carlo simulation via MATLAB, some of the drawbacks of 
the current parametric models have been overcome by the newly proposed MVP model. Afterwards, 
two tests were conducted to examine the performance of MVP model in the evaluation of the whole 
system's reliability and the traditional CCF factors. Evidence has indicated that the MVP model is 
more reliable than the traditional ones in most cases because the calculation results using MVP 
model's outcomes are closer to the real values assumed in the simulation previously. Hence, it can be 
concluded that compared to the current parametric CCF models, the MVP model has better features.  
 International Conference on Structural Safety & Reliability.  
In addition, the great features of EB method can be employed to make use of the failure data 
collected from source plants. The illustrative case studies in Chapter 5 has shown that the results of 
different methods can be quite different. Therefore, the combination of traditional data mapping and 
EB method is a useful way to perform plant-specific estimation. This method makes up for the 
limitation of data and generates specific evaluation results for the plant of interest.  
6.2 Remaining challenges 
Although great advantages of the MVP model have been proved, some drawbacks still remain. The 
MVP model only makes use of the data of the target plant. In addition, as the MVP model 
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distinguishes the components within the same CCCG, the shortage of available data becomes more 
obvious unless the observation time is long enough. Sometimes the data of each component may not 
be sufficient to perform EB estimation.  
Apart from the above, the uncertainty of the EB estimation also exists in the evaluation of hyper-
parameters which has not been taken into consideration. A robust assumption is made that the 
parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 calculated by QBW or Vaurio's EB methods are assumed to be correct. However, 
it is necessary to take account of the uncertainty in the process of parameter estimation.  
In the data mapping process in this thesis, a simplification assumption is made that all the 
component statuses of complete failure (C), degraded (D) and incipient (I) are considered as failure. 
However, in order to obtain a more realistic result, impact vectors should be considered in the 
analysis.  
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Appendix A 
James-Stein estimator formula derivations 
The James-Stein (JS) estimator proposed by Vaurio and Jӓnkӓlӓ (1992) takes another form other than 
EB in assimilating the information from others. The paper starts with the property of the MLE 
measured by the mean and variance of the estimator, namely 𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖� and 𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖�.To investigate this, 
the authors first evaluate the conditional and unconditional moments of the number of failure 
events𝑁𝑖. 
Given𝜆𝜆𝑖, a realization of the unknown 𝜆𝜆, the conditional moments of 𝑁𝑖 can be found by routine as 
𝐸[𝑁𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖] = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖 , 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖] = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖 
The unconditional moments of 𝑁𝑖 can be found by taking integration over𝜆𝜆𝑖, 
𝐸[𝑁𝑖] = �𝐸[𝑁𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖]𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖] = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 
The unconditional variance can be found by first evaluating the unconditional second original 
moment  
𝐸�𝑁𝑖
2� = �𝐸�𝑁𝑖2|𝜆𝜆𝑖�𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = �(𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖2𝑇𝑖2)𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖] + 𝑇𝑖2𝐸�𝜆𝜆𝑖2�= 𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖2(𝜇2 + 𝜎2) 
Then, 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑖] = 𝐸�𝑁𝑖2� − 𝐸2[𝑁𝑖] =  𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖2𝜎2 
With these, the mean and variance of the MLE can be found as 
𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = 𝐸 �𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖 � = 𝐸[𝑁𝑖]𝑇𝑖 = 𝜇 
𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑖]𝑇𝑖2 = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 𝜎2 
The above two equations correspond to Eqs. (14) and (15) in the paper, respectively. 
For the estimation of the population mean 𝜇, the authors proposed an unbiased, minimum variance 
estimator as 
𝑚 = �𝑤𝑖?̂?𝜆𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
= �𝑤𝑖 𝑁𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  
It can be readily shown by using the above unconditional moments that  
𝐸[𝑚] = 𝜇�𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑚] = �𝑤𝑖2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖�𝑛𝑖=1  
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In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of 𝜇, it is required that  
�𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1 
Final determination of the weights 𝑤𝑖  results from the solution to the constrained minimization 
problem with 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑚] being the objective function and the above normalization equation being the 
constraint function.By using theLagrangian multiplier method, the constrained minimization problem 
can be modified to the following equivalent unconstrained minimization: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒:  𝑓 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑚] + 2𝛼 �1 −�𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
� 
where 𝛼 is the Lagrangian multiplier.  Taking derivative of 𝑓, one has 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 2𝑤𝑖 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� − 2𝛼 = 0  
for  𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛 . This equation implies that 𝑤𝑖  is inversely proportional to  (𝜎2 + 𝜇/𝑇𝑖) , which is 
also 𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖�.  Thus, the optimal weights for the estimation of 𝜇 is 
𝑤𝑖𝑜 = 𝜓𝑖∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑘𝑖=1  
in which 𝜓𝑖 is the precision
1
With the optimal weights, the variance of the estimator for population mean is thus 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑚𝑜] = �𝑤𝑖𝑜2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖�𝑛𝑖=1 = 1∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑛𝑖=1  
 of ?̂?𝜆𝑖, the reciprocal of 𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖�. 
Finally the expected squared error of the JS estimator of the form ?̅?𝜆𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝑚 + (1 − 𝐵𝑖)?̂?𝜆𝑖  can be 
evaluated.   
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐸�?̅?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2 = 𝐸�𝐵𝑖𝑚 + (1 − 𝐵𝑖)?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2 = 𝐸 �−𝐵𝑖�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚� + �?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖��2= 𝐵𝑖2𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚�2 − 2𝐵𝑖𝐸 ��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�� + 𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2 
Clearly, the third term is 
𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�
2 = ��𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2�𝜆𝜆𝑖� 𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = �𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖�𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖)𝑑𝜆𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 
For the first term, 
𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚�
2 = 𝐸 ��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇� − (𝑚 − 𝜇)�2 = 𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇�2 − 2𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇�(𝑚 − 𝜇) + 𝐸(𝜇 −𝑚)2 
                                                     
1 In Bayesian statistics, the precision is more often used than the variance. 
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in which 𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇�
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝜆𝑖), 𝐸(𝜇 −𝑚)2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚), and 
𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇�(𝑚 − 𝜇) = 𝐸 ��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇��𝑤𝑖?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝜇� + �?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜇��𝑤𝑗�?̂?𝜆𝑗 − 𝜇�
𝑗≠𝑖
� = 𝑤𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝜆𝑖) 
Thus, the first term can be expressed as 
𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚�
2 = (1 − 2𝑤𝑖)𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖� + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚) 
For the second term,  
𝐸 ��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝑚��?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�� = 𝐸 ��(1 − 𝑤𝑖)�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖� −�𝑤𝑗�?̂?𝜆𝑗 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�
𝑗≠𝑖
� �?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖��
= (1 −𝑤𝑖)𝐸�?̂?𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖�2 = (1 − 𝑤𝑖) 𝜇𝑇𝑖 
Putting these terms back, one thus has 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 [1 − 2𝐵𝑖(1 −𝑤𝑖)] + 𝐵𝑖2 �(1 − 2𝑤𝑖) �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� + �𝑤𝑗2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗�𝑛𝑗=1 �= 𝜇
𝑇𝑖
[1 − 2𝐵𝑖(1 −𝑤𝑖)] + 𝐵𝑖2(1 −𝑤𝑖)2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� + 𝐵𝑖2�𝑤𝑗2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗�𝑗≠𝑖  
Finally, the expected sum of squared errors (SSE) is2
                                                     
2 It is important to calculate the expected sum of square errors.  Otherwise, the optimal weights for 𝑚 would 
not be optimal for the JS estimator.  In this case, 
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 2𝐵𝑖 𝜇𝑇𝑖 − 2(1 − 𝑤𝑖)𝐵𝑖2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� + 2𝛼 = 0 
 
𝑄 = �𝑄𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Substituting the optimal shrinkage factor 𝐵𝑖𝑜 into the equation yields 
𝛼 = (1 − 𝑤𝑖)𝐵𝑖2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� − 𝐵𝑖 𝜇𝑇𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 (𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄ )2𝜎2 + 𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄  
This is not a constant for all 𝑖, which is contrary to the property of a Langrangian multiplier. 
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To minimize 𝑄  under the normalization condition  ∑𝑤𝑖 = 1 , one can use the same Lagrangian 
multiplier approach that has been used earlier for 𝑚. Taking derivative of 𝑄  yields, for each 𝑖 =1, … ,𝑛, 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 2�𝐵𝑗 𝜇𝑇𝑗𝑗 − 2�𝐵𝑗2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗�𝑗 + 2𝑤𝑖 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖��𝐵𝑗2𝑗 + 2𝛼 
Also, we have 
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐵𝑖
= −2(1 − 𝑤𝑖) 𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 2𝐵𝑖 �(1 − 2𝑤𝑖) �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� + �𝑤𝑗2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗�𝑛𝑗=1 � = 0 
The authors claimed after equation (30) that 𝑄𝑖  is minimized by selecting the optimal weights 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑜which also minimize the variance of 𝑚.  Based on this claim, the authors further derive the 
optimal shrinkage factor as 
𝐵𝑖0 = 𝜇/𝑇𝑖𝜎2 + 𝜇/𝑇𝑖 
which can be seen as the ratio of the sample variance to the total variance of the MLE. 
Indeed, when 𝑤𝑖𝑜 = 𝜓𝑖∑𝜓𝑗 = 𝜓𝑖𝑆  as shown above,  
�𝜎2 + 𝜇
𝑇𝑖
� = 1
𝜓𝑖
= 1
𝑤𝑖𝑆
 
Thus, (1 − 2𝑤𝑖) �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖� + �𝑤𝑗2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗�𝑛𝑗=1 = 1 − 2𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑆 + � 𝑤𝑗2𝑤𝑗𝑆𝑛𝑗=1 = 1𝑆 � 1𝑤𝑖 − 1� 
Hence, 
𝐵𝑖𝑜 = (1 −𝑤𝑖)𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄(1 𝑤𝑖⁄ − 1)/𝑆 = 𝜇 𝑇𝑖⁄1 (𝑆𝑤𝑖)⁄ = 𝜇/𝑇𝑖𝜎2 + 𝜇/𝑇𝑖 
With the optimal shrinkage factors, the first derivative of 𝑄with respect to𝑤𝑖 is expressed as 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 2��𝐵𝑗𝑜 𝜇𝑇𝑗 − 𝐵𝑗𝑜2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑗��𝑗 + 2𝑤𝑖 �𝜎2 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖��𝐵𝑗𝑜2𝑗 + 2𝛼 
Noting that 
𝐵𝑗𝑜
𝜇
𝑡𝑗
− 𝐵𝑗𝑜
2 �𝜎2 + 𝜇
𝑇𝑗
� = 0 
and ∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑜2𝑗 = Constant, it is readily shown that the optimal 𝑤𝑖𝑜 is the same optimal weight for 𝑚. 
Finally, the minimized expected sum of square errors of the JS estimator is simply expressed as 
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𝑄𝑖𝑜 = 𝜎2𝐵𝑖𝑜 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑜 
Also note that 𝑄𝑖𝑜 is always smaller than 
𝑉𝑎𝑟�?̂?𝜆𝑖� = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁𝑖]𝑇𝑖2 = 𝜇𝑇𝑖 + 𝜎2 
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Appendix B 
Derivation of QBW's EB estimator 
A gamma prior distribution is assumed as (1), which is conjugate to the likelihood function. Then the 
posterior is also a gamma distribution.  
𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖) = 𝛽𝛼𝜆𝜆𝑖𝛼−1𝑒−𝛽𝜆𝑖𝛤(𝛼)    , 𝜆𝜆𝑖 ,𝛼,𝛽 > 0 (1) 
Mean and variance of the prior are expressed by hyper-parameters. 
𝜇 = 𝛼
𝛽
  and  𝜎2 = 𝛼
𝛽2
 (2) 
Due to the moment method, it is easy to obtain the following relations. 
𝐸(𝑁𝑖|𝜆𝜆𝑖) = 𝛼𝛽 𝑇𝑖 (3) 
𝐸�𝑁𝑖
2|𝜆𝜆𝑖� = 𝐸�𝜆𝜆𝑖2𝑇𝑖2 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑇𝑖� = 𝐸�𝜆𝜆𝑖2�𝑇𝑖2 + 𝛼𝛽 𝑇𝑖     = [𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜆𝜆𝑖) + [𝐸(𝜆𝜆𝑖)]2]𝑇𝑖2 + 𝛼𝛽 𝑇𝑖 
                                                         = � 𝛼
𝛽2
+ �𝛼
𝛽
�
2
� 𝑇𝑖
2 + 𝛼
𝛽
𝑇𝑖 (4) 
Let  
𝑈 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
and   𝑊 = ∑ 𝑁𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑇𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 (5) 
Then the expectation of U and W are 
𝐸(𝑈) = ∑𝛼𝛽 𝑇𝑖
∑𝑇𝑖
= 𝛼
𝛽
 (6) 
𝐸(𝑊) = ∑ � 𝛼𝛽2 + �𝛼𝛽�2� 𝑇𝑖2
∑𝑇𝑖
2 = 𝛼𝛽2 + �𝛼𝛽�2 (7) 
From equation (6) and (7), the obtained in the following form.  
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𝛼� = 𝑈2
𝑊 − 𝑈2
  and  ?̂? = 𝑈
𝑊 − 𝑈2
 (8) 
And Quigley et al. have already proved the above are consistent estimators of the hyper-parameters 𝛼 
and 𝛽.  
Finally, the posterior distribution is shown as (9). And the mean and variance of the posterior of each 
event can be calculated from (10). 
𝜋(𝜆𝜆𝑖|𝑁𝑖 ,𝛼,𝛽) = (𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)𝛼+𝑁𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑖𝛼+𝑁𝑖−1𝑒−(𝛽+𝑇𝑖)𝜆𝑖𝛤(𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)  (9) 
𝑀𝑖 = (𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)(𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)   and  𝑉𝑖 = (𝛼 + 𝑁𝑖)(𝛽 + 𝑇𝑖)2 (10) 
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